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THE PRIVACY OBSTACLE COURSE:
HURDLING BARRIERS TO
TRANSNATIONAL FINANCIAL
SERVICES
JOEL K. REIDENBERG *
Professor Reidenberg addresses the challenge to transnationalfinan-
cial services resulting from national regulation of information process-
ing. National laws around the world seek to define fair information
practices for the private sector and contain prohibitions on data transfers
to foreign destinations that lack sufficient privacy protection. The effect
of these laws for the financial services industry is significant because fi-
nancial services depend on personal information. Professor Reidenberg
argues that the international attempts to harmonize information prac-
tice standards and the national efforts to regulate information process-
ing encourage divergence of national standards for financial services
He argues that regulatory flexibility and customization is necessary to
support financial services and accomodate, without circumventing, di-
vergent national standards of fair information practicem Professor
Reidenberg's theme of convergence focuses on bridging national differ-
ences, rather than on harmonizing national standards He concludes by
offering a shared rule to manage regulatory differences that enables the
use of a set of legal technological and social techniques. Thus, Professor
Reidenberg proposes convergence on a flexible and customized way to
bridge national differences.
INTRODUCTION
TN thinking about the next decade, students of financial services tend
rnaturally to focus on the implications that a transnational marketplace
has for the regulation of the banking, securities, and insurance indus-
tries.' As a consequence, recent international trade negotiations seek to
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1. See Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in an Internation-
alized Marketplace, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transna-
tional Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S77 (1992); Felsenfeld, The
Compatibility of the UNICITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers with Arti-
cle 4A of the UCC, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transna-
tional Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S53 (1992); Lichtenstein, U.S
Restructuring Legislation: Revising the International Banking Act of 1978, For the
Worse?, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Finan-
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create a more harmonized regulatory environment for financial services.2
These initiatives generally seek convergence on liberalization of national
laws.
Global electronic networks for financial services blur the boundaries of
these traditional regulatory frameworks.' As an astute European once
observed, "in the final analysis, the financial system is a network of infor-
mation."4 In essence, information processing is a basic component of
financial services. 5 Financial services depend on personal information
and create significant information about individuals.6 Traditional bank-
ing functions such as money transmission and credit extension require
sensitive and detailed information about individuals, while the transac-
tion records from these functions create important sources of personal
information.7 These transaction records provide significant information
about an individual's life and lifestyle.' Similarly, insurance services are
cial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S37 (1992); Malloy, Bumper Cars:
Themes of Convergence in International Regulation, in Annual Survey of Financial Insti-
tutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L.
Rev. S1 (1992); Shirley, The What, Why and How of Privatization-A World Bank Per-
spective, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Finan-
cial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S23 (1992); Tekinalp, Turkey's New
Financial Leasing Law and Industry, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Reg-
ulation, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S117 (1992);
Wegen, Transnational Financial Services-Current Challenges for An Integrated Europe,
in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial Serv-
ices in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S91 (1992).
2. During the Uruguay Round negotiations within the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, policy-makers have sought to include services in the negotiations. See
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round
of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Sept. 20, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1623, 1627. Themes of con-
vergence may also be found in the recent Free Trade Agreements and multinational
banking policies. See Free Trade Area Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Isr., 24 I.L.M.
653, 679-81; Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 I.L.M. 281; B.I.S.
Comm. on Banking & Supervisory Practices, Consultative Paper on International Conver-
gence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, 30 I.L.M. 967, 967 (1991); Malloy,
supra note 1, at S14-20.
3. See R. Bruce, J. Cunard & M. Director, The Telecom Mosaic 265 (1988).
4. C. Goldfinger, La G6ofinance 401 (1986).
5. See Fascell & Schlundt, United States International Communications and Infor-
mation Policy: A Crisis in the Making?, 5 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 486, 490-94 (1983) (the
authors were the chairman and staff director, respectively, of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives).
6. See Berkvens, Payment Systems Meet the EC Data Protection Initiative, Int'l Fin.
L. Rev., Aug. 1991, at 33.
7. Opening a deposit account routinely includes the disclosure of a client's social-
security number, home address, work address, telephone numbers, and wealth. Ob-
taining credit requires an individual to disclose among other information, financial and
employment histories. Cf Citicorp Plan to Sell Credit Card Information Stirs Controversy
about Consumer Privacy, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1991, at 22 (transaction records are valua-
ble commercial assets).
8. For example, records from a checking account or credit card reveal a client's
commercial relationships and personal habits or preferences. See J. Bing, Reflections on
a Data Protection Policy for 1992, at 4 (paper presented to conference on "Legal Chal-
lenges and Opportunities Created by the Prolific Growth of Electronic Information Serv-
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information-intensive. Life and health insurance providers must collect
and use detailed information about an insured's medical history. Casu-
alty insurers must collect sensitive information about the value of insured
personal assets. Even brokerage services require the processing of per-
sonal information and provide details on the lives of individuals.
Financial networks "transnationalize" personal information.9 The
technology creates "global products" and "global services."'" Banking
and payment systems involve significant international flows of personal
information such as transaction records.' I The regulation (or lack of reg-
ulation) of information processing has a critical impact on the evolution
of transnational financial services.
As the international economy transnationalizes, there has been a fail-
ure to achieve a multilateral consensus for the framework necessary to
promote global information services. 2 There are competing international
instruments for data processing, and each effort to promote uniform in-
ternational standards for data processing has failed.' 3 Many European
countries, including France, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and
the United Kingdom, have broad data processing statutes that apply in-
formation privacy principles to industry, including the financial services
sector. 4 These national laws do not adopt identical norms. Among
ices," organized jointly by the Council of Europe and the Commission of the European
Communities, Luxembourg, March 27-28, 1990) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
9. See Goldfinger, supra note 4, at 287-91; Eger, The Global Phenomenon of
Teleinformatics: An Introduction, 14 Cornell J. Int'l L. 203, 205 (1981) [hereinafter
Teleinformatics]; Fascell & Schlundt, supra note 5, at 489-91; Herman & Halvey, Interna-
tional Flow of Data Is Threatened, Am. Banker, Sept. 25, 1990, at 12.
10. See Gassman, Vers un cadre juridique internationale pour l'informatique et autres
nouvelles techniques de l'information, in 1985 Annuaire francais de droit international
(Centre national de la recherche scientifique) 747.
11. See Berkvens, supra note 6, at 33; Herman & Halvey, supro note 9, at 12.
12. See Gassman, supra note 10, at 748; Kirby, Legal Aspects of Transborder Data
Flow, 11 Computer/L.J. 233, 242-43 (1991).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 29-162.
14. See Loi No. 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative i l'informatique, aux fichiers et aux
libert~s [Law No. 78-17 of Jan. 6, 1978 concerning data processing, records and freedom],
J.0. du 7 janvier et rectificatif au 3.0. du 25 janvier [hereinafter French Law]; The Dan-
ish Private Registers Act, No. 293, June 8, 1978, amended by Act No. 383, June 10, 1987,
translated in Danish Ministry of Justice, Pub. No. 622 (Oct. 2, 1987) [hereinafter Danish
Law]; Wet Persoonsregistraties [Act of Dec. 28, 1988, providing rules for the protection
of privacy in connection with personal data files], Stb. 1988, at 665, translated in Council
of Europe Doc. Ca-PD (89) 4 (Jan. 27, 1989), reprinted in A. Nugter, Transborder Flow
of Personal Data Within the EC 397-410 (1990) [hereinafter Dutch Law]; Bundesdaten-
schutzgesetz (BDSG), translated in Germany: Federal Data Protection Act 1991, Council
of Europe Doc. CJ-PD (91) 30 (12 July 1991) [hereinafter German Law]; U.K. Data
Protection Act 1984, reprinted in A. Nugter, supra, at 365-95 [hereinafter British Law];
see also Nugter, supra note 14 (analysis of the French, Dutch, British and superseded
German laws); Evans, European Data Protection Laws, 29 Am. J. Comp. L 571, 578-80
(1981); Data Protection Roundup, Privacy L. & Bus., July 1991, at 2-7 (summarizing the
status of data protection legislation in 31 countries). A recent draft directive on data
protection issued by the Commission of the European Communities has also increased
attention to privacy protection. See Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the pro-
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other things, these laws permit national authorities to prohibit transfers
of personal information such as credit card or insurance data to countries
without sufficient privacy protection. In North America and Asia, differ-
ent approaches are used to deal with privacy issues.15 Recently, several
foreign governments have restricted the transmission of personal infor-
mation to countries perceived as ignoring computer privacy concerns.1 6
For transnational financial services, differences between national infor-
mation processing regulations and the treatment of data exports creates
an obstacle course for transnational service providers that is increasingly
hazardous.
Although the financial services industry has noted the importance of
information privacy regulation, data processing rules are just beginning
to appear on the international trade agenda, though rarely in a promi-
nent position."7 The recent free trade agreements, for example, do not
address these issues, and the Uruguay Round of GAT negotiations has
only recently taken tentative steps to include privacy matters. 8 The pri-
vacy dimension poses a major challenge for regulatory policy and signifi-
cant hurdles for the development of transnational financial services.' 9
The thesis of this Article is that the search for international harmoni-
zation of national information practice laws has been elusive; that na-
tional fair information practices are evolving-particularly in the context
of financial services; and, that therefore, the appropriate evolution for
tection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data, Eur. Comm. Doc.
COM 314 final-SYN 287 (Sept. 13, 1990) [hereinafter Draft EC Directive].
15. See infra text accompanying notes 66-96.
16. Norway, Austria, Germany, and Sweden have each imposed restrictions on inter-
national data flows because of privacy concerns. See Compte rendu de la onzidme confdr-
ence des commissaires d la protection des donnies (Berlin, 29-31 aout 1989) in C.N.I.L.,
10e Rapport d'activit6 308-09 (1990) [hereinafter Compte rendu]. France has restricted
the transfer of personal information to Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, and the United States
on privacy grounds. See infra notes 178-80. The United Kingdom has also blocked a
data transfer to the United States. See infra note 183.
17. See, e.g., Drake & Nicholaidis, Ideas, Interests and Institutionalization: "Trade in
Services" and the Uruguay Round, 46 Int'l Org. 37, 47-48, 89 (1992) (data protection
appears sporadically on the trade agenda); Regulation of Financial Services Ten Global
Issues, 18 AMEX Bank Rev, Apr. 3, 1991, at 7 (privacy is mentioned as a peripheral
issue).
18. See Free Trade Area Agr., Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Isr., 24 I.L.M. 653; Free Trade
Agr., Jan. 2, 1988, U.S.-Can., 27 LL.M. 281.
Initially, the Uruguay Round mandate for GATT negotiations on services did not
mention data processing or privacy. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Minis-
terial Declaration on the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Sept. 20,
1986, 25 I.L.M. 1623, 1627. Subsequently, negotiators have debated including a mention
of privacy issues in either the telecommunications annex or in a framework agreement.
In either case, the treatment of the issues will be rather general.
19. This Article will focus generally on cross-border banking and will use occasional
examples from the insurance and securities fields. A detailed treatment of each type of
financial service activity and its privacy implications would necessitate an entire series of
articles. This Article will also be confined to fair information practices in the private
sector and will not address public sector issues such as the controls on government access
to and use of personal information related to financial services.
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the regulatory obstacles to transborder flows of personal information
must allow flexibility and regulatory customization to accommodate di-
vergent protection without circumventing privacy goals. This theme of
convergence shifts the debate to shared rules for the management of reg-
ulatory differences rather than continuing the "dialogue de sourds" on a
shared set of uniform rules.
Part I of this article explores the mechanisms used to regulate informa-
tion processing. It analyzes how the two international legal instruments
reflect a search for fair information practices and invite non-uniform sub-
stantive and procedural standards. Part I also demonstrates that these
instruments do not provide significant guidance for personal information
in the financial services sector. Beyond the international efforts, this Part
demonstrates that the national laws similarly reflect attempts to define
rules of fair information practices. It shows that the national techniques
vary substantially, and are still evolving, in the treatment of personal
information. Part II analyzes various data export restrictions. This anal-
ysis shows that the requirements for data exports are not consistent and
present real obstacles to cross-border financial services. Part III shows
that the obstacles posed by these data export restrictions present a regu-
latory challenge for transnational financial services based on the difficulty
and complexity of comparisons among national laws. Finally, Part IV
argues that the policy choices for dealing with transborder data flows in a
complex, dynamically changing information marketplace requires flexi-
bility and sensitivity toward varying methods of regulation. This flexibil-
ity calls for a particularized approach to rules on transnational fair
information practices. A flexible and customized approach to regulation
of information flows allows regulators to avail themselves of both legal
and extra-legal tools. This Article concludes by suggesting a combina-
tion of legal, technological and societal techniques that policy-makers
may use to achieve privacy satisfaction in the global information
economy.
I. INSPECTING THE COURSE: REGULATORY SCHEMES FOR FAIR
INFORMATION PRACTICES
For over one hundred years, legal systems have sought to define rules
for the protection of information about individuals.' Information prac-
tices relating to both individuals and corporations are often proscribed by
government regulation. In the United States, the rules are cast as a set of
rights protecting individual privacy.21 During the last century, serious
attempts to define clearly the privacy right and its underlying basis have
20. These efforts to protect individual rights trace their origins to the legendary arti-
cle by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
21. The classic American formulation by Warren and Brandeis described privacy as a
"right to be let alone." Id
S1411992]
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been inconclusive.22 In the context of computer-processed information,
the United States has traditionally sought, in limited ways, to define fair
information practices. 23 Great importance is placed on the value of the
free flow of information.24 Essentially, these definitions seek to balance
unrestrained information flows with the need to safeguard individuals
from various harms that occur as a result of overly free flows of
information.
Europeans have similarly sought to identify the sphere of control or
protection that individuals may have regarding personal information.
Some European countries include information about legal persons within
the sphere of protection. 25 Europeans refer to such rights as "data pro-
tection" rather than privacy. 26 The European philosophy derives from a
strong belief in "information self-determination. ' 27 As in the American
privacy concept, data protection seeks to achieve a set of fair information
practices. In general, Europeans emphasize human rights concerns.28
22. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A comment c (1977) (privacy is
divided into four categories with none "exclud[ing] the possibility of future develop-
ments"); A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom 7 (1967) (arguing for an individual's right to
control personal information: "Few values so fundamental to society as privacy have
been left so undefined in social theory or have been the subject of such vague and con-
fused writing by social scientists."); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity:
An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962, 962 (1964) (arguing that privacy
protects human dignity and noting that, despite the many cases founded on privacy, con-
fusion persists as to what the right protects); Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren
and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 326, 327-28 (1966) (criticizing the
protection of privacy in tort law, in part, because of its open-ended nature); Miller, Per-
sonal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an Informa-
tion-Oriented Society, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 1089 (1969) (arguing that privacy means the
control of flows of information and that legal notions of privacy are inadequate in dealing
with the problems of computerization); Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 393,
393 (1978) (noting the "concept of 'privacy' is ill defined and has an economic founda-
tion). See generally Fried, Privacy, 77 Yale L.J. 475 (1968) (arguing that privacy is the
right to define one's self for others); Prosser, The Right of Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383
(1960) (attempting to catalog and define interests protected by privacy).
23. See U.S. Privacy Protection Study Comm'n, Personal Privacy in an Information
Society: The Report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission 10-11 (1977) [hereinafter
Privacy Report]; U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Secretary's Advisory Comm. on
Automated Personal Data Sys., Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens (1973),
reprinted in Privacy Report, supra, at 15 n.7; Eger, supra note 9, at 210-11; Reidenberg,
Privacy in the Information Economy-A Fortress or Frontier for Individual Rights?, 44
Fed. Comm. L. J. 195 (forthcoming).
24. See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the
freedom of speech.").
25. See Data Protection Roundup, supra note 14, at 2-7 (Austria, Denmark, Iceland,
Luxembourg, and Norway protect both natural and legal persons).
26. See Walden & Edwards, Data Protection, in Computer Law 198, 200-02 (Chris
Reed ed. 1990).
27. See Judgment of the First Senate (Bverfge, Karlsruhe, Dec. 15, 1983) translated
in 5 Hum. Rts. L.J. 94 (1984) (landmark census case in the German Federal Constitu-
tional Court ruling that the 1977 German statute on information privacy was unconstitu-
tional because it did not adequately recognize information self-determination).
28. The early European interest in data protection derived from the desire of human
rights advocates to adapt the European Human Rights Convention to the computer age.
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At the international level, two major attempts tried to define fair infor-
mation practices on a global basis: the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (the "OECD") sought to establish norms, and
the Council of Europe created legal standards.29 The attempts faced the
classic challenge of accommodating different national techniques and
concepts.3 ° While the two efforts approached the transnationalization of
information from different perspectives,3 the underlying tension between
human rights concerns and free flows of information framed the harmo-
nization attempts with a similar set of issues for fair information prac-
tices. Neither of the international efforts sought specifically to regulate
financial services, yet each has a direct effect on the regulation of transna-
tional financial services. Despite the efforts, no international consensus
emerged on obligatory standards. National techniques remain critical
for fair information practice standards. These techniques, too, have a
direct effect on financial services, and the diversity poses a challenge for
the development of transnational financial services.
A. International Objectives
In 1980, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment promulgated voluntary guidelines for the protection of privacy and
transborder data flows (the "OECD Guidelines").32 The following year,
the Council of Europe opened for signature a convention on data
processing and privacy (the "European Convention").33 While neither of
the documents deals explicitly with financial services, each tries to enun-
See, eg., Walden & Edwards, supra note 26, at 199; Explanatory Report on the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data
4, 19 I.L.M. 282, 300 (1980) [hereinafter Explanatory Report]. With this history, it is
curious that some European countries grant these protections to corporations and not
just individuals. See infra text accompanying notes 104-06.
29. See infra notes 32-60 and accompanying text.
30. See, eg., D. Tallon, L'harmonisation des rigles du droit privd entre pays de droit
civil et de common law, R.I.D.C. 514 (1990) (explaining difficulties harmonizing common
law and civil law rules).
31. See infra note 35-36 and accompanying text.
32. See Organization for Economic Co-operation & Dev., Recommendation of the
Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder
Flows of Personal Data, O.E.C.D. Doc. (C 58 final) (Oct. 1, 1980), reprinted in 20 I.LM.
422 (1981) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
33. See Council of Eur., Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Eur. T.S. No. 108, reprinted in 20
I.L.M. 377 (1981) [hereinafter European Convention]. The Council of Europe is an in-
tergovemmental organization that promotes human rights, including civil, political, eco-
nomic and social rights. See Statute of the Council of Eur., May 5, 1949, art. 3, Eur. T.S.
No. 1. (1968). Membership consists of twenty-six countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus,
Czech & Slovak Federal Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tur-
key, and United Kingdom.
1992] S143
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ciate standards of fair information practice for the private sector.34
Both instruments focus on the conflict between safeguarding privacy
and free flows of information, but the drafting organizations emphasize
different perspectives. The OECD Guidelines highlight that free flows of
information are critical for economic development, while the European
Convention stresses the need to protect individuals.35 These differences
should not be surprising; the OECD is designed to foster economic
growth among industrialized nations, while the Council of Europe has as
its mission the advancement of human rights.36 In keeping with these
differing perspectives, the legal nature of the two instruments varies sig-
nificantly. The OECD Guidelines posit voluntary adherence and stress
the development of self-regulation.37 Signatories to the European Con-
vention, however, are obligated to enact conforming national legisla-
tion,3" and the treaty implicitly prefers enforcement through an
administrative agency with supervisory powers.3 9
Despite the apparent differences in approach, the two instruments
identify a similar set of fair information practice issues, though the in-
struments diverge on precise standards.' Each targets the processing of
information about identified or identifiable individuals.4 The European
34. See European Convention, supra note 33, § 3(1); OECD Guidelines, supra note
32, $ 2.
35. See OECD Guidelines, Preamble, supra note 32, at 422; European Convention,
Preamble, supra note 33, at 422; Bing, The Council of Europe Convention and the OECD
Guidelines on Data Protection, 1984 Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. 271, 272; Cole, New
Challenges to the U.S. Multinational Corporation in the European Economic Community:
Data Protection Laws, 17 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 893, 901 (1985); Patrick, Privacy
Restrictions on Transnational Data Flows: A Comparison of the Council of Europe Draft
Convention and OECD Guidelines, 21 Jurimetrics J. 405, 409 (1981). The explanatory
memorandum issued by the Council of Europe for the European Convention also casts
the debate in terms of "information power" and "social responsibility." Explanatory Re-
port, supra note 28, 2 at 299.
36. Compare Statute of the Council of Eur., May 5, 1949, art. 3, Eur. T.S. No. 1
(1968) (membership in the Council is predicated on acceptance of principles of human
rights and fundamental freedoms) with Convention on the Organization for Economic
Co-operation & Dev., Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 1730-32 (organization designed to
foster economic welfare of members and promote harmonization of national laws).
37. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 32, 19.
38. See European Convention, supra note 33, § 4(1). Ten countries (Austria, Den-
mark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Swe-
den, and the United Kingdom) have ratified the European Convention, while eight
nations (Belgium, Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, and Turkey)
have also signed without ratification. Five members (Finland, Liechtenstein, Malta, San
Marino, Switzerland) have not signed the treaty at all. See Council of Eur., Chart of
Signatures and Ratifications, Jan. 8, 1990 (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Data
Protection News from Around the World, Privacy L. & Bus., Aug. 1990, at 2.
39. See European Convention, supra note 33, § 13(2)(a).
40. See generally Bing, supra note 8 (describing the differences between the two in-
struments); Cole, supra note 35, at 896-900 (discussing background to both instruments);
Eger, supra note 9; Patrick, supra note 35 (also comparing the OECD Guidelines and the
European (draft) convention).
41. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 32, l(b); European Convention, supra note
33, § 2a. The European Convention further permits signatories to apply the principles to
[Vol. 60S144
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Convention is broader in that it expressly allows the application of the
principles to legal persons.42 Financial services are affected by the appli-
cation of fair information practice regulation to data about corporations
as well as individuals.
The OECD Guidelines and the European Convention focus generally
on data processing activities, though neither is limited to computer-
processed information.43 Both set forth policies on data collection,' use
of personal information,45 storage of personal information, and trans-
mission and dissemination of personal information.47 Unlike the OECD
Guidelines, the substantive rights and obligations in the European Con-
vention represent the minimum level of protection that signatories must
legal persons as well as non-computerized record systems. See European Convention,
supra note 33, § 3(2)b-c.
42. Compare European Convention, supra note 33, § 3(2)(b) (signatories must give
notice if the European Convention principles protect legal persons) with OECD Guide-
lines, supra note 32, l(b) (the guidelines do not prevent the protection of legal persons).
See also Grossman, Transborder Data Flow: Separating the Privacy Interests of Individu-
als and Corporations, 4 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 1 (1982) (arguing that it is inappropriate to
protect legal persons in the same manner as individuals).
43. The European Convention refers to personal data undergoing automatic process-
ing, though signatories may apply the protections to manual record systems. See Euro-
pean Convention, supra note 33, § 3(2)(c). The OECD Guidelines indicate that
principles may also be applied to non-automatic processing of personal data. See OECD
Guidelines, supra note 32, 2(c). This distinction is of minor significance for transborder
financial services.
44. The instruments deal with the manner of data collection. See OECD Guidelines,
supra note 32, 7 (data must be obtained lawfully and fairly, with consent of the data
subject where appropriate); European Convention, supra note 33, § 5(a) (personal data
shall be obtained and processed fairly and lawfully). Each calls for a right of access to
stored information. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 32, 13a (individual has right to
know of existence of data collection); European Convention, supra note 33, § 8a (individ-
uals should receive notice of data collection). Each places a limitation on unnecessary or
overly intrusive collections of personal information. See OECD Guidelines, supra note
32, 8 (setting forth a relevancy test); European Convention, supra note 33, § 5c (setting
forth a test of adequacy and relevancy). Both documents emphasize the importance of
data accuracy. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 32, 8 (data should be "accurate,
complete and kept up-to-date); European Convention, supra note 33, § 5d (data should be
"accurate, and where necessary, kept up-to-date").
45. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 32, 1 9-10 (personal data should not be used
for purposes other than those specified to the data subject at the time of collection, unless
consent has been granted); European Convention, supra note 33, § 5b (data may not be
used in a way incompatible with specified purposes).
46. See European Convention, supra note 33, § 5e (limits duration of storage).
47. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 32, 10 (personal information should not be
disclosed except for legitimately specified purposes); European Convention, supra note
33, § 5(a)-(b) (limits disclosures of personal information if not in furtherance of legitimate
processing).
Another aspect also covered by both documents is a security requirement to prevent
unintended disclosures or unwanted access to personal information. See OECD Guide-
lines, supra note 32, 11 ("[p]ersonal data should be protected by reasonable security
safeguards"); European Convention, supra note 33, § 7 (appropriate security measures
should be taken for personal data). Because these measures relate to third party interfer-
ence with personal information and not to fair information practices of the data user per
se, this Article will not give specific consideration to security issues.
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enact into national legislation.4" Ironically, the convention, thus, invites
disharmony of substantive standards that go beyond the minimum level.
For example, the European Convention recognizes a need for countries
to adopt additional safeguards that protect certain types of data such as
race, health, and sexual preferences or activity information.49 These
must be adopted on a national level. As a result, signatories are en-
couraged to have different levels of protection for sensitive data. In the
context of financial services, this particular ambiguity over specific stan-
dards of protection can have special significance. For certain insurance
services dependent on actuarial data, these restrictions may pose critical
problems-namely satisfying different levels of protection on a cross-bor-
der basis.
The generality of the rights and obligations in both the OECD Guide-
lines and European Convention can be troublesome generally for trans-
national information services and specifically for transnational financial
services. In particular, the assumptions underlying these instruments
may be anachronistic for complex financial service information process-
ing. For example, any information that relates to an identifiable person
is covered under the two instruments. However, often, personal informa-
tion for financial services is encrypted or coded with account numbers or
administrative numbers. In these instances, linking the information to a
particular person may be difficult, if not impossible, for various partici-
pants processing the data. In addition, each of the international instru-
ments imposes the fair information practice obligations on the
"controller" of personal information. This means the ability to deter-
mine the content and use of personal information. In the context of so-
phisticated computer networks and global telecommunications linkages,
there may be several entities that simultaneously "control" the personal
information, or there may be no single entity that "controls" the personal
information." The European Convention is also founded on the notion
that information transfers will be discrete transactions. 2 For financial
services, distributed databases may mean that personal information is
shared and created regardless of borders.
48. Compare OECD Guidelines, supra note 32, 19 (OECD member countries
"should establish" privacy rules to implement guidelines) with European Convention,
supra note 33, § 4 (signatories "shall take the necessary measures in its domestic law" to
implement the principles).
49. See European Convention, supra note 33, § 6.
50. See European Convention, supra note 33, § 2(d); OECD Guidelines, supra note
32, l(a).
51. For example, in the case of a credit card transaction, personal information will be
handled by several entities, including the retailer, network processor, card brand proces-
sor, and card issuing bank. Each may have some control over the data, but it may only
be the card issuer that controls the linkage between the processed numbers and the card-
holder's identity. The retailer, though, may have control over certain name-linked infor-
mation, such as the customer's identity and credit card holdings.
52. See European Convention, supra note 33, § 12(1) (referring to "transfers" across
borders).
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The ambiguity of these principles ineluctably leads to asymmetry in
implementation for financial services. Although the OECD Guidelines
emphasize sectoral codes of conduct, the elaboration of such codes is left
to industry without any government or OECD supervision. 3 Industry
groups have rarely developed such codes and have incentives to develop
minimal standards when fair information practices are addressed. The
European Convention provides an interpretive mechanism for specific
sectoral applications under the aegis of a consultative committee, rather
than representatives from the concerned industries.' This promotes lim-
ited consideration of the industry perspective and is more likely to result
in stricter standards. Because the purpose is to promote consistent na-
tional interpretations of the treaty principles, the consultative commit-
tee's interpretations are only hortatory and do not bind national
authorities who may give greater weight to the industry view.
Following the OECD approach, industry groups in several countries
have, nevertheless, sought to develop codes of fair information practices
for financial services.55 Only one recommendation has been issued for
financial services through the European Convention process. It covers
payment and other related operations.5 6 The recommendation takes a
very restrictive view of permissible data processing activities for personal
information gathered in relation to payment operations such as fund
transfers and credit card transactions.57 The recommendation, for exam-
ple, severely limits the internal use by a financial institution of client in-
formation."8 The recommendation also limits the external disclosures,
use and matching of data collected during the course of payment opera-
tions. A financial institution may not, for example, use, or cross-match
personal information for marketing purposes, either for its own account
or for third parties.5 9 Personal information acquired in connection with
53. See OECD Guidelines, supra note 32, 19(b).
54. See European Convention, supra note 33, §§ 18-19. Section 18 establishes a con-
sultative committee and section 19 authorizes it to express opinions on the application of
the convention. The consultative committee does have limited industry participation
through a representative with observer status from the International Chamber of
Commerce.
55. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
56. See Council of Eur., Recommendation R(90)19 on the Protection of Personal
Data Used for Payment and other Related Operations (Sept. 13, 1990) [hereinafter Rec-
ommendation R(90)19].
57. See Berkvens, supra note 6, at 33. But see Bourland, La Sauvegarde de la vie
privie dans les transferts e-lectroniques de fonds 1991 Droit de l'informatique & des
t6l6coms 17, 25-27.
58. See Recommendation R(90)(19), supra note 56, app. 3.4 (restricts the permissi-
ble purposes for the collection and storage of personal data to verifying identity and de-
termining the validity and lawfulness of the payment transaction). The Recommendation
takes a more flexible view of the data that constitutes "personal information". It does not
apply to data that can be associated with an individual only through unreasonable
amount of time, cost, and manpower. See id app. 1.2. This definition differs from the
European Convention. See European Convention, supra note 33, § 2(a).
59. An individual must be notified in writing and must consent prior to the use of
transaction information for direct marketing purposes. See Recommendation R(90)(19),
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payment operations may not be communicated to third parties for mar-
keting or other non-payment purposes without an affirmative consent."
These two instruments, though attempting to harmonize national reg-
ulatory standards for fair information practices, encourage differences
over the issues of fair information practices in the financial services
context.
B. National Objectives
While the OECD Guidelines are perceived as making some contribu-
tion to international harmonization of fair information practice issues,61
and the European Convention strives to develop uniform standards, the
national treatment of fair information practices continues to diverge
rather than converge. Some of the national techniques pre-date the two
international efforts,62 and those more recent national enactments refine
the implementation of fair information practice standards in dissimilar
ways.63 Even the European Convention by its terms does not create uni-
form, self-executing rights or obligations.' 4
Essentially, two approaches have been taken at the national level.
Some countries, such as the United States, treat data privacy issues on an
ad hoc basis and seek to focus narrowly on particular data processing
issues through sectoral laws and industry self-regulation. Others, such as
France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, have enacted omni-
bus legislation consistent with the broad stipulations in the European
Convention and thereby try to regulate all data processing activities.65
1. The Ad Hoc Approach
Although broad concepts of privacy were first identified in the United
States, the American approach to fair information practice represents the
paradigm use of ad hoc techniques. There is a complex web of federal
and state legislation combined with state common-law rights that seek to
protect against targeted privacy abuses; constitutional rights do not ad-
dress information processing activities wholly within industry.66
In the context of financial services, the ad hoc approach rarely ad-
dresses each of the principles of fair information identified in the OECD
Guidelines and European Convention. For example, existing federal leg-
islation in the United States addresses the treatment of personal informa-
supra note 56, app. at $% 4.2, 4.3. The consent, however, need not be an affirmative
declaration. Notification to the individual gives rise to a presumption of consent, unless
the individual objects. See id.
60. See Recommendation R(90)(19), supra note 56, app. 5.1(c).
61. See Gassman, supra note 10, at 750.
62. See e.g. French Law, supra note 14 (enacted in 1978).
63. See Dutch Law, supra note 14; German Law, supra note 14; Nugter, supra note
14.
64. See European Convention, supra note 33, § 4(1).
65. See Evans, supra note 14, at 578.
66. See Reidenberg, supra note 23, at 208-09.
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tion for credit services,67 debt collections,6" and electronic fund
transfer.69 These laws do not, however, provide consistent treatment for
fair information practice issues. The credit laws do not focus on serious
data collection issues such as notice and consent for the collection of
personal information and on the collection of unnecessary information. 0
Similarly, the credit laws do not carefully constrain the purposes for col-
lection or use of personal information or the storage of inaccurate and
obsolete information. 1 The federal regulation of electronic fund trans-
fers targets data accuracy and does not address the other fair information
practice concerns.72 Other federal legislation does not thoroughly ad-
dress the treatment of personal information for the remaining areas of
financial services such as the securities industry.73 Interestingly, in Aus-
tralia, where ad hoc protection generally applies to the private sector, the
public sector privacy law was recently amended to apply specifically to
credit reporting activities and was not amended to apply to other finan-
cial services.'
At the state level in the United States, there are additional ad hoc laws
governing financial services.75 Some states include more stringent rules
on data collection for credit card or check transactions.76 State laws may
also restrict disclosures of customer information by banks.7 Insurance
services are also regulated at the state level. These laws tend to govern
some aspects of the collection, use, and dissemination of personal infor-
mation by insurance companies, but do not generally address practices
67. See Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1988); Fair Credit Reporting Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1988); Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1988).
68. See Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1988).
69. See Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (1988).
70. See Reidenberg, supra note 23, at 210-215, 219-220
71. See id
72. See id. at 215, 219.
73. In the securities field, the use of personal information relates to the management
of customer accounts and usually is limited to transaction records. Federal securities
laws do address record-keeping practices for the enforcement of the securities trading
laws, but not for fair data processing uses. See, e.g., Investment Advisor's Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-1, -21. (1988) (requiring registered investment advisers to maintain certain records
on client transactions).
74. See Australia's Privacy Commissioner Rules on Credit and Health Data, Privacy
L. & Bus., Dec. 1991, at 16-17.
75. See Reidenberg, supra note 23, at 229-31.
76. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1747.8 (West Supp. 1991); Md. Com. Law Code Ann.
§ 13-318 (Supp. 1991); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 520-A (McKinney Supp. 1991); Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 62A.3-512 (West Supp. 1992). These laws restrict the types of infor-
mation that may be collected in connection with a credit card or check purchase. They
are designed to stem credit card fraud problems. See Reidenberg, supra note 23, at 230-
31.
77. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 36-9k (West 1987); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 17, para.
360(c) (Smith-Hurd 1981 & Supp. 1991). Common law fiduciary obligations may also
require that a bank maintain the confidentiality of customer information. See LR.
Fischer, The Law of Financial Privacy: A Compliance Guide 5.04[3] (2d ed. 1991).
This obligation addresses the disclosure to third parties of a client's personal information
and would not affect the collection, use or storage of personal information.
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related to unnecessary information or to the storage of personal
information."8
The complexity and narrow characteristic of the ad hoc approach may
also be reflected by the complementary layer of state common-law rights
in the United States. Four well-developed common-law rights of privacy
exist: (1) the intrusion upon seclusion; (2) public disclosures of private
facts; (3) publicity that places one in a false light; (4) misappropriation of
one's name or likeness for a commercial purpose.79 These rights, how-
ever, provide limited application to information processing concerns.8 0
Consequently, the rights provide little guidance for fair information prac-
tices in the financial services sector.8" In other countries, courts have
similarly established particular rights. For example, the Hungarian Con-
stitutional Court recently ruled that the Hungarian constitution bars the
collection and use of the national identity numbers if there is no definite
and limited purpose for the collection and use.8 2
As an alternative to sectoral legal rights, the ad hoc approach encour-
ages self-regulation to set fair information practice standards.8 3 Often,
industry promotes self-regulation as a way to forestall government pre-
scriptions for fair information practices.8 4 Rather permissive, and rarely
complete, standards of fair information practice result from industry self-
regulation. Through this ad hoc technique, two varieties of self-regula-
tion guide financial services activities. Some organizations chose to
78. See Reidenberg, supra note 23, at 233-34.
79. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652 (1977); Prosser, supra note 22, at 389.
These common law rights have been codified in many states. See Reidenberg, supra note
23, at 222, 228.
80. Intrusion upon seclusion may protect only against unfair or unlawful data collec-
tions through surreptitious and intrusive means. Public disclosure of private facts may
guard only against shocking disclosures to the general public of intimate personal infor-
mation. Similarly, false-light publicity may protect only against the wide dissemination
of inaccurate personal information. Misappropriation liability may arise from some com-
mercial uses of personal information without consent. See Reidenberg, supra note 23, at
221-27, 234-35.
81. If a financial services company were to widely disseminate health or financial
information, the tort liability might be imposed under the doctrine of public disclosure of
private facts. However, the dissemination must be made to the general public and the
facts must be shockingly offensive. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (1977).
These thresholds are not likely to be met easily.
82. See Hungary's Constitutional Court Rules Against Arbitrary Use of PINS, Privacy
L. & Bus., Dec. 1991, at 20-21.
83. See, e.g., U.S. Office of Consumer Affairs, Administration Position Statement on
Privacy (1991) (policy statement calls for respect by business of five basic privacy princi-
ples, but does not recommend any legal rights).
84. Industry representatives testify before congressional committees and government
commissions to argue for self-regulation rather than legislative action. See, e.g., Privacy
Report, supra note 23, at 34; Hearing on Domestic and International Data Protection Is-
sues: Public and Corporate Reactions to Privacy Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Info.,
Justice and Agric. of the House Gov't Operations Comm., 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
[hereinafter Hearings]. The same response may be seen in Europe. See Dresner, Pub-
lisher's Comment, Privacy L. & Bus., Aug. 1990, at 1.
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adopt specific policies on fair information practices.8 5 In other cases, an
entire arm of the industry may develop a code of fair information prac-
tices. In Canada, for example, the banking industry association and an
insurance industry group have each drafted a code of fair information
86practices.
Self-regulation and sectoral legal rights are not mutually exclusive. In
Japan, consumer credit information is protected by edicts from the Min-
istry of Finance and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
while the Center for Financial Industry Information Systems ("FISC")
elaborated voluntary guidelines for other personal information processed
by financial institutions, insurance companies, securities companies, and
companies offering credit systems.87 FISC based its code on the OECD
Guidelines.
In some legal cultures, the dividing line between sectoral rights and
self-regulatory guidelines may not be clear. Although the FISC guide-
lines in Japan are designed for voluntary implementation, the Ministry of
Finance has strongly encouraged institutional compliance.88  Conse-
quently, this ad hoc technique may promote the most tailored set of fair
information practice standards for financial services. Similarly, the Japa-
nese Ministry of International Trade and Industry recommended that
other industries in the private sector comply with a different set of volun-
85. For example, the American Express Company has pledged itself to a set of fair
information practices that consist of: (1) collecting only relevant information and disclos-
ing its intended uses; (2) allowing customers to opt-out of inclusion on marketing lists; (3)
taking measures to ensure the accuracy of personal information; (4) provide security
against unauthorized access to personal information; (5) disclose personal information
only with customer consent; (6) encourage business partners to respect customer privacy;
(7) train employees to adhere to privacy principles. See Am. Express, The American
Express Consumer Privacy Principles (1991) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
Equifax, a major U.S. credit reporting agency, also has a set of "information policies."
See Hearings, supra note 84, 25-26. This policy is a pseudo-code of fair information
practice standards.
In the United States, 180 companies are said to have adopted the OECD Guidelines as
a corporate information policy. See Gassman, supra note 10, at 750. However, recent
poll data indicates that less than one-sixth of U.S. insurance, credit, and banking organi-
zations have advisory boards or panels that deal with privacy issues. See Louis Harris &
Assocs., The Equifax Report on Consumers in the Information Age 98-99 (1990).
86. See Canadian Bankers' Ass'n, Model Privacy Code for Individual Customers (Dec.
1990); Canadian Life & Health Ins. Ass'n, Policy Holder Servicer Right to Privacy
(1980).
87. See FISC, Guidelines on the Protection of Personal Data For Financial Institu-
tions (March 1987); Yamashita, Protecting Personal Data in the Private Sector, 78 Japan
Computer Q. 30, 31 (1989); Yui, Protective Measures for Personal Data in the Consumer
Credit Industry, 78 Japan Computer Q. 38, 41-43 (1989). FISC used the OECD Guide-
lines as the model.
88. FISC is a non-profit corporation supported by the Ministry of Finance. The
chiefs of the Banking and Securities Bureaus in the Ministry of Finance issued a state-
ment: "We trust that all financial organizations will use this guideline to deal appropri-
ately with the issue of personal data in the future. The Japanese authorities will be
observing future developments with great interest." Yamashita, supra note 87, at 32.
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tary guidelines developed by JIPDEC in 1986.89 In Canada, although
the bank association code of practice is voluntary, all chartered banks
must be members of the association. 90 Also, the Minister of Consumer
and Commercial Relations in Ontario, Canada indicated that insurance
companies must conform to the privacy guidelines issued by the Cana-
dian Life and Health Insurance Association in order to do business in
Ontario. 91
Since privacy rights are usually targeted narrowly under an ad hoc
approach, there is a natural tendency to rely on private enforcement
mechanisms. The United States, for example, has no single government
supervisory agency to monitor the collection or use of personal informa-
tion or to enforce existing rights, especially in connection with financial
services. 92 For situations dependent on self-regulation, by definition,
there is no government supervision. This tendency is also reflected in
Hong Kong and Japan where neither country has a government agency
designed to supervise industry fair information practices.93
In countries using ad hoc techniques, the debate over targeted protec-
tions and their evolution is on-going. The United States, for example,
has a plethora of proposals that revisit the treatment of personal informa-
tion by the credit industry.94 In Hong Kong, where there is a voluntary
set of data protection guidelines, the Law Reform Commission is work-
ing on broad legislation.95 In Canada, the provincial governments are re-
89. See Yamashita, supra note 87, at 32, 35. JIPDEC, the Japan Information
Processing Development Center, is a non-profit think tank closely allied to the Ministry
of International Trade and Industry. See id. at 32.
90. See Canadian Bankers' Association Strengthens Privacy Code, Privacy L. & Bus.,
Winter 1990/91, at 14.
91. See Can. Life & Health Ins. Ass'n, supra note 86.
92. For example, in addition to private litigation, the Federal Trade Commission is
authorized to prosecute violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Fair Credit
Billing Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1988). The Electronic
Funds Transfer Act is enforced by the banking supervisory agencies. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1693 (1988). Enforcement of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act is by either
private litigation or the prosecutor. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988).
93. For financial services, to the extent that the Japanese Ministry of Finance and the
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry have promulgated or assisted the
development of privacy codes these ministries may have strong persuasive powers. See
supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., H.R. 29, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 194, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.(1991); H.R. 421, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 633, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991);
H.R. 670, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 1751, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
95. See generally Dep'ts & Gen. Div. Admin. Servs. & Info. Branch, Gov't of H.K.,
Data Protection Principles and Guidelines (1988) (existing government-recommended
voluntary guidelines); Mortimer, Hong Kong Plans Data Protection Law, Privacy L. &
Bus., July 1991, at 14-17 (the government set up a "sub-committee of the Hong Kong
Law Reform Commission in March 1990 to formulate proposals for Data Protection
Legislation"); Memorandum on Privacy Protection of Personal Information, The Law in
Hong Kong and Options for Reform from Mark Berthold, Sec'y of the Privacy Subcom-
mittee of the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission to the Law Reform Commission(Feb. 1990) (this paper represented the personal views of the author and does not neces-
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examining ad hoe protection. 96
2. The Omnibus Approach
In contrast to the ad hoc approach, many countries prefer omnibus
legislation as the tool to define fair information practices for both the
private and public sectors. As with the ad hoc approach, the omnibus
laws fail to converge on a uniform set of standards, though unlike the ad
hoc approach, all the basic issues of fair information practice found in
the European Convention are generally covered. The first generation of
omnibus laws, including the French, Swedish, and original German data
protection statutes, set forth single, coherent sets of principles that were
to be applied in all circumstances. 97 The second generation of laws begin
to seek more flexible mechanisms that differentiate among sectors and
increase the types of available sanctions as well as self-regulatory mecha-
nisms.98 This generation includes the Dutch and revised Danish statutes.
In contrast to the ad hoe approach, omnibus legislation often creates
powerful administrative agencies with significant enforcement powers. 99
In France, the Commission nationale de l'informatique et des libert~s
(the "C.N.I.L.") supervises compliance with the data protection statute,
prosecutes violations, and has authority, with broad discretion, to con-
duct on-site searches and seizures."° The C.N.I.L. tends to focus on
private sector enforcement and has, for example, made a number of in-
spections of insurance data processing sites. °10 In the United Kingdom,
the Data Protection Registrar performs a similar role. The new German
statute gives enforcement powers to state supervisory agencies and per-
mits searches of business records."'2 Not surprisingly, the omnibus ap-
proach emphasizes penalties for violations of fair information practices.
Harmed individuals may recover actual or statutory damage amounts.
sarily reflect the views of the Law Reform Commission) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
96. See Letter from Paul-Andr6 Comeau, President, Commission d'acc~s 5
l'informatique du Quebec, to Joel R. Reidenberg, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham
University (Feb. 20, 1992) (on fie with the Fordham Law Review).
97. See Nugter, supra note 14, at 19-20. One should note that Nugter's analysis refers
to the first German data protection statute. A more recent law has entered into force in
Germany. See generally German Law, supra note 14 (Germany enacted the Federal Data
Protection Act in 1991).
98. See Nugter, supra note 14, at 19.
99. See D. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies 11-16 (1989). The
omnibus laws tend to establish data protection authorities. See, e-g., French Law, supra
note 14, § 6; Dutch Law, supra note 14, § 37; Danish Law, supra note 14, § 22; British
Law, supra note 14, §§ 10, 19.
100. See French Law, supra note 14, §§ 6, 11, 21. The C.N.I.L. may exercise these
powers to investigate complaints, improve its knowledge of data practices and enforce its
decisions. See C.N.I.L., Dix ans d'informatique et libert~s 68 (1988) [hereinafter
C.N.I.L., Dix ans].
101. See A. Lucas, Le droit de l'informatique 173-75 (1987); C.N.I.L., 9e Rapport
d'activit6 211-15 (1988) [hereinafter C.N.I.L., 9e Rapport].
102. See German Law, supra note 14, § 38(l)-(4).
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In addition, the data protection authorities may seek civil and criminal
sanctions against infringing parties.
Although many of the countries with omnibus data protection laws are
signatories of the European Convention and proponents of the OECD
Guidelines, the omnibus technique has not achieved uniform rules within
the scope of national laws. Most of the omnibus laws seek to protect
only individuals. 10 3 Several apply, also, to legal persons." The distinc-
tion in connection with information about individuals acting in their ca-
pacities as employees or officers of corporations may be blurred for some
laws. For example, the French law is limited to information about indi-
viduals, but France interprets personal information broadly to include
corporate files containing information relating to "officers, stockholders
or partners." ' The British law is interpreted similarly for sole proprie-
torship companies." ° Other laws may specifically address financial
data. 0 7 A recent European effort, however, seeks to limit the defini-
tional scope of personal information by excluding information that could
be used to identify particular individuals only through extraordinary or
unreasonable efforts.'0" This exclusion would be significant for financial
services that involve intermediate data processing activities of personal
information about identifiable, but not actually identified individuals
(such as account number referencing). The new German law makes
some special allowances for storage of depersonalized information. 109 In
addition, a number of the omnibus laws apply to non-computerized
records on individuals. 10
The national laws seek significant and different fairness requirements
for data collection. Most omnibus regimes require careful disclosure to
individuals at the time of data acquisition, though the nature of these
disclosures varies. France, for example, mandates that an individual
must be informed of the obligatory or optional character of providing
personal information, the consequences of refusing to provide informa-
tion, the identity of any persons receiving the information and the exist-
ence of the right of access and correction."' The British law also
103. See Data Protection Roundup, supra note 14, at 2-7.
104. The Austrian, Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, Luxembourgeois and Norwegian laws
give rights to information about legal persons. See id. at 2-7.
105. See C.N.I.L., Dix ans, supra note 101, at 42; H. Croze & Y. Bismuth, Droit de
l'informatique 36 (1986).
106. See U.K. Data Protection Registrar, Guideline 2-The Definitions, $ 4.1 (1989).
107. See, eg., Danish Law, supra note 14, § 1(1).
108. See Draft EC Directive, supra note 14, § 2(b). This view differs from some of the
laws. The British, for example, view depersonalization skeptically. See U.K. Data Pro-
tection Registrar, Guideline 2-The Definitions, 3.2 (1989).
109. See German Law, supra note 14, § 30(1).
110. For example, the Dutch, French and German laws apply to manual records. See
French Law, supra note 14, § 5 (applies to manual records used in conjunction with data
processing); Dutch Law, supra note 14, § I (applies if data is systematically disposed);
German Law, supra note 14, § 3(2) (applies to non-automated structured personal
information).
111. See French Law, supra note 14, § 26 (forbids unfair and illegal data collections),
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stipulates that personal information shall be obtained fairly; this means
that the collector of personal information must notify the individual of
the data collection, of the reasons for the collection, whether disclosures
of the information will be made to others, and must refrain from collect-
ing excessive information. 1 2 Similar requirements exist in the new Ger-
man statute. 1 3 Thus, the standards of individual consent to data
collection are similar, but not identical. For financial services, these dif-
ferences may be important; the collection requirements for credit infor-
mation, card transaction information, and insurance underwriting
information may require onerously detailed disclosure in some countries
to satisfy the general purpose fairness requirements. Collections may
also need to comply with several differing requirements.
In addition, many of the laws place prohibitions on the collection and
processing of "sensitive data" that may be dangerous for individuals if
misused. The European Convention specifically recognizes this need, yet
not all European laws define "sensitive data" in the same way; the con-
cept draws from different European experiences with discrimination, ha-
tred, and genocide. Information identifying racial origin, opinions
(political, religious, or philosophical), union membership, and criminal
convictions is usually targeted."1 4 Nevertheless, the differences may be
important. For example, the French law does not include health or sex-
ual preference information, while the British, Danish, and Dutch laws
do." 5 In the context of financial services, some of these restrictions may
be problematic for insurers developing actuarial tables and verifying
health payments, as well as for banks or credit institutions seeking to
protect against fraud through reference to criminal records. In some
§ 27 (lists the notice obligations for data collection); see also C.N.I.L, Dix arts, supra
note 101, at 16.
112. See British Law, supra note 14, Sched. 1, Pt. 1, § 1-7; Office of U.K. Data Protec-
tion Registrar, Fifth Annual Report 8 (1989) [hereinafter Fifth Report].
113. See German Law, supra note 14, §§ 4(2), 33.
114. See European Convention, supra note 33, § 6 (listing information related to "ra-
cial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs... health or sexual life... (and]
criminal convictions"); C.N.I.L., Dix ans, supra note 101, at 42-43.
115. Compare French Law, supra note 14, § 31 (setting forth sensitive data as informa-
tion reflecting: racial origin, political, philosophic or religious opinions, or trade union
affiliation) with British Law, supra note 14, § 2(3) (supplemental protections may apply to
information relating to: racial origin, political opinions or religious or other beliefs, phys-
ical or mental health or sexual life, or criminal convictions) and Danish Law, supra note
14, § 3(2)0imits processing of data on: race, religious belief or color of skin, political
sexual or criminal matters and on health, social problems or excessive use of intoxicants)
and Dutch Law, supra note 14, § 7(1) (requires regulatory guidance for the use of infor-
mation relating to: "religious beliefs or philosophy of life, race, political persuasion, sexu-
ality or intimate private life and medical, psychological, criminal or disciplinary"
information). The German Law proscribes communication of information concerning
health, criminal and administrative offenses, religious or political views, and information
divulged to an employer under the labor law. See German Law, supra note 14, § 28(2)lb.
The European Convention covers data relating to race, political opinions, religious or
other beliefs, health and sex life, and criminal convictions; it does not mention union
membership or any other categories. See European Convention, supra note 33, § 6.
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cases, however, additional restraints on sensitive data may never actually
be implemented.' 1
6
As in the European Convention, national laws seek to impose strict
purpose limitations on the use of personal information. In the new Ger-
man law, personal information may generally be used by private entities
only "in accordance with the purposes of a contract or quasi-contractual
fiduciary relationship ... [unless] the data can be taken from generally
accessible sources." '117 The personal information must still be obtained
fairly. France views the purpose limitation as one of the most critical
components of data protection policy.118 Both the British and the
French laws require the data collection purposes to be specifically regis-
tered with the data protection authority.119 Under the Dutch law, per-
sonal information cannot generally be communicated to third parties
unless the communication satisfies a specified purpose or the individual
has given express, written consent.120 For financial services, purpose lim-
itations may pose difficulties for constantly evolving, multi-layered net-
works of service providers.
Omnibus legislation also seeks to assure the quality of available per-
sonal information. National laws grant individuals similar rights of ac-
cess to stored personal information and impose obligations to ensure the
correction of erroneous information. 12 1 Some special exemptions from
the access requirements may be granted for financial institutions per-
forming statutorily defined duties. These exemptions are not uniform.' 22
The quality norm also leads to variable rules on the duration of data
storage. The Danish law, for example, generally limits storage to a five-
year period.'23 Other laws have different durational limits. 124 In the
case of credit information, French regulations limit storage to three years
for settled accounts and five years for defaulted accounts. 125
116. See Dutch Law, supra note 14, § 7. No implementation guidance has been issued
by the Registration Chamber.
117. German Law, supra note 14, § 28(1).
118. See C.N.I.L., Dix ans, supra note 101, at 38 (secondary uses of personal informa-
tion are a major risk to individual rights).
119. See British Law, supra note 14, § 4(3)(b) & Sched. 1, 11(2); French Law, supra
note 14, § 19.
120. See Dutch Law, supra note 14, §§ 11(1), 12(1).
121. See British Law, supra note 14, §§ 21, 22, 24; French Law, supra note 14, §§ 34-
37; Dutch Law, supra note 14, §§ 29, 31; German Law, supra note 14, §§ 34, 35; Danish
Law, supra note 14, § 7(a).
122. See, e.g., French Law, supra note 14, § 40 (access to health information kept by
an insurer may be indirect through the individual's physician); German, supra note 14,
§ 34(4) (access not required if statutory authority exempts collection from notice require-
ments under section 33(2)(3)); Isle of Man Data Protection Act 1986 § 29 (access not
required if it would interfere with the discharge of a statutory function),
123. See Danish Law, supra note 14, § 4(2).
124. See, e.g., French Law, supra note 14, § 28 (duration limited to registered period);
German Law, supra note 14, § 35(2) (erasure required as soon as no longer needed).
125. See D61ib6ration No. 88-83 du 5 juillet 1988, reprinted in C.N.I.L., 9e Rapport,
supra note 102, at 381-83; see also C.N.I.L., 9e Rapport, supra note 102, at 202.
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The omnibus approach stresses transparency of private data processing
activities.' 26 The public should be able to discover data processing activi-
ties that involve personal information. To this end, the laws oblige data
processing activities to be either disclosed to a government data protec-
tion authority or licensed by the national authority.1 2 Generally, the
data processing purposes, types of personal information being stored,
contact information for individuals to seek access to and correction of
data, and destinations of personal information must be filed with the au-
thority.'28 These registration systems tend to be rather cumbersome.
The U.K. Data Protection Registrar has recently concluded that simplifi-
cation is an important goal.' 2 9
The more nuanced, second-generation approach to omnibus regulation
recognizes the difficulties inherent in applying general principles to all
industries in a rapidly changing technological environment.'"a These
laws allow diverging interpretive mechanisms to evolve. The revised
Danish law, for example, includes specific provisions for credit report-
ing,13' direct marketing, 132 and third party electronic data processing.
33
The Dutch law uses a novel technique of elaborating fair information
practice rules, and permits sectoral groups to develop codes of practice
for approval by the Registration Chamber."~ Only proposals for pre-
cisely defined sectors, drafted by representative groups that have con-
sulted with interested organizations, are considered.' 35  The Dutch
approval process includes a period of public comment.' 36 The financial
services sector has initiated some of the first sectoral codes. The Associa-
tion of Dutch Bankers and the Association of Insurance Companies are
each drafting codes of practice to implement the data protection princi-
ples, though neither code has been released yet for public comment.'
37 If
these codes are approved, the process offers a persuasive safe-harbor at-
testing to compliance with the statutory obligations even though the
126. See C.N.I.L., Dix ans, supra note 101, at 17.
127. See, e.g., French Law, supra note 14, §§ 16, 17 (licensing for private sector data
processing, automatic licensing for non-risk, common practices); British Law, supra note
14, §§ 4, 7(6) (licensing of data users and computer bureaux, though applications have
provisional validity upon filing); Dutch Law, supra note 14, § 24 (licensing requirement
for private sector data processing); German Law, supra note 14, § 32 (notification re-
quirement for private sector).
128. See, e.g., French Law, supra note 14, § 19; British Law, supra note 14, § 4(3).
129. See Fifth Report, supra note 112, at 73-79.
130. See id at 67-72.
131. See Danish Law, supra note 14, §§ 8-16.
132. See id §§ 17-19.
133. See id § 20.
134. See Dutch Law, supra note 14, § 15(1).
135. Facsimile from the Hon. Peter J. Hustinx, President, Registration Chamber, to
Joel R. Reidenberg, Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University 1 (March 6, 1992)
(on fie with the Fordham Law Review).
136. See id at 2.
137. See id at 1-2.
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codes will still not be binding on Dutch courts. 3 ' The legal character is
more powerful and persuasive than a purely industry-drafted, sanc-
tionless self-regulatory scheme. 39 Hong Kong is considering a similar
device in its plans for an omnibus law.1"4
The omnibus approach has not led to a uniform view of extraterritori-
ality. '4 The rights and obligations of data protection acts apply to for-
eign data processing activities in different manners. The French law, for
example, applies only to processing operations in France. 42 The British
law applies only to persons in the United Kingdom who control the con-
tent and use of personal information, whether or not the processing oc-
curs within the United Kingdom.1 43 And, the Dutch law applies to data
files located within the Netherlands and to data processing outside the
Netherlands if the user is within the Netherlands and the data pertains to
a Dutch resident.'" For multinational financial services, the concurrent
application of varying standards of fair information practice can be a
detrimental influence on service development.
The varying rules contained in omnibus laws may also dictate non-
uniform corporate organization requirements. Some omnibus laws re-
quire that a data protection officer be employed by companies processing
personal information.145 Others merely require that a division be respon-
sible for data protection poicy.146 These structural issues can have a
significant impact on global financial service companies. In some cases,
the fair information practice rules may even require the formation of new
legal entities, such as the incorporation of a trade association in order for
financial institutions to share information on delinquent debtors. t4
Financial services have benefitted from some national guidance on the
implementation of fair information practice principles. In the United
Kingdom, banking issues have recently been addressed.'4 1 In addition,
138. See Dutch Law, supra note 14, § 15(6).
139. See Nugter, supra note 14, at 167 (if these self-regulatory sectoral codes are not
adopted in a manner satisfactory to the Registration Chamber, mandatory sectoral regu-
lations may be issued).
140. See Mortimer, supra note 95, at 16.
141. See Nugter, supra note 14, 182-94.
142. See, eg., French Law, supra note 14, § 47.
143. See British Law, supra note 14, § 39.
144. See Dutch Law, supra note 14, § 47.
145. See, e.g., German Law, supra note 14, § 36.
146. The French law, for example, requires that the application for the registration of
data processing activities specify the corporate division responsible for data protection
policy and the contact for individuals to exercise the right of access. See French Law,
supra note 14, § 19.
147. France required the formation of a "groupement d'int6rt 6economique" in order
for credit establishments to share data on delinquent consumer debtors. See C.N.I.L., 9e
Rapport, supra note 102, at 203-04.
148. See Fifth Report, supra note 112, at 4-5. In 1989, the British Review Committee
on Banking Services Law (known as the Jack Committee) recommended a variety of
measures to improve the banker's duty of confidentiality and establish standards of "best
practice" for customer consent to disclosures of information. Id. at 32-33. The banking
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the information practices of credit reporting agencies have been scruti-
nized. The U.K. Data Protection Registrar has challenged the use of
third-party information by credit reporting agencies in reports on credit
applicants. 149 These guidance issues revolve around the fairness of data
collection (notice to individuals and legitimacy of collected information)
and processing purposes. The U.K. Data Protection Registrar has also
focused on the ambiguity of the principles for electronic point-of-sale
transactions (EFTPOS) and is seeking to develop particular guidance.'
The French data protection authorities have also historically been con-
cerned by the application of the law's principles to financial services.
The C.N.I.L. has developed simplified registration procedures for data
processing relating to client accounts,1"' retail lending, 52 and insur-
ance. 153 To satisfy these regulations, the C.N.I.L. specifically limits the
types of personal information that may be collected, the uses of and ac-
cess to such personal information, as well as the duration of storage.
Sensitive data protection issues have been raised in France in connection
with the development of private databases for lost and stolen checks."
The C.N.I.L. has sought to establish that the personal information used
by any such databases be relevant for the narrow objectives of preventing
payment on lost and stolen checks. 55 The C.N.I.L. required that indi-
viduals provide written consent before the information may be
disseminated.
The C.N.I.L. raised similar concerns for databases related to defaulted
consumer loans and provided comparable guidance. 56 Even credit scor-
ing is prohibited by the French law, though the C.N.I.L. does not inter-
pret this strictly.157 The C.N.I.L. has also been sensitive to computerized
industry responded and adopted a code of practice that mentions data protection. See
generally British Bankers Ass'n, Good Banking (1992).
149. See Fifth Report, supra note 112, at 6-7; Equifax Eur. Ltd. v. Data Protection
Registrar, U.K. Data Protection Tribunal Appeal Decision, 5-6 (June 28, 1991); Infolink
Ltd. v. Data Protection Registrar, U.K. Data Protection Tribunal Appeal Decision, 5-6,
18-19 (May 31, 1991); CCN Sys. Ltd. v. Data Protection Registrar, U.K. Data Protection
Tribunal Appeal Decision 4-5 (undated opinion) [collectively hereinafter Data Tribunal
Cases].
150. See Fifth Report, supra note 112, at 8-9.
151. See Norme Simplifie No. 12: Ddlibiration No. 80-22 du 8juillet 1980, reprinted
in C.N.I.L., Informatique et Libert&s No. 1473 165-68 (1991).
152. See Norme Simplifioe No. 13: Ddlibiration No. 80-23 du 8juillet 1980, reprinted
in C.N.I.L., Informatique et Liberts No. 1473 169-72 (1991) [hereinafter NS 13].
153. See Norme Simplifiie No. 16: Dilibiration No. 81-04 du 20janvier 1981, reprinted
in C.N.I.L., Informatique et Liberts No. 1473 181-84 (1991).
154. See C.N.I.L., Ile Rapport d'activit6 131-42 (1991) [hereinafter Ile Rapport].
Databases have been proposed in the public sector through the Banque de France as well
as the private sector through regional groups such as organizations of retailers.
155. See C.N.I.L., lie Rapport, supra note 154, at 132.
156. See id at 142-53. The proposed database was initiated through the Banque de
France rather than a private institution.
157. See, eg., French Law, supra note 14, § 2 (no private sector decision on character
may be based solely on a computer generated profile); NS 13, supra note 152, at 181-84
(simplified registration unavailable if credit scoring is used). The C.N.I.L., however, is
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profiling in the insurance sector and has issued rules for such prac-
tices."5 8 Risk calculations are limited to the use of certain parameters,
including the insured's age, marital status, and health situation.1"9 In
response to concerns about the use of medical records, the C.N.I.L. also
investigated the practices of life insurance companies and required a
trade association to terminate its database on "high-risk" individuals. I I
In contrast, the reinsurance industry has been permitted to use the na-
tional identification number in order to price high-risk policies.161 The
C.N.I.L. has similarly delimited fair information practices in connection
with health insurance payments. Health care providers may electroni-
cally access insurance data.'62 The personal information is restricted to
identity, address, insurance number, and insurance status.
II. THE STARTING BLOCK: EXPORT OBSTACLES FOR FINANCIAL
SERVICES INFORMATION
Because of the transnationalization of personal information process-
ing, fair information practice rules often consider the international impli-
cations of differing standards. 63 Transborder data flows raise legitimate
concerns for national authorities of the sufficiency of foreign fair infor-
mation practice rules. Problems may arise in several contexts: the differ-
ing levels of fair information practice standards; the uncertainty of
applicable law; and, the practical problems of implementation."' The
French fear of "data havens," for example, is reasonable when informa-
tion processing for French companies may be structured off-shore to
avoid fair information practice rules in France.1 65 Nevertheless, a coun-
try's interest in off-shore data processing standards for financial transac-
tions that may take place between a foreign national and a foreign
financial institution suggests that the application of national fair informa-
said not to object to credit scoring when credit is granted; the practice is seen as objec-
tionable only when credit is denied. See C.N.I.L., 9e Rapport d'activit6, supra note 101,
at 200 (1989) (a financial institution need not explain the denial of credit to an applicant,
but the C.N.I.L. emphasizes that a credit score may not be the sole reason for denial).
158. See C.N.I.L., Dix ans, supra note 100, at 102.
159. See id.
160. See C.N.I.L., lie Rapport, supra note 154, at 153-55; Ddlibdration No. 90-95 du
11 septembre 1990, reprinted in C.N.I.L., lie Rapport, supra note 154, at 155-57.
161. See Ddlibration No. 90-43 du 3 avril 1990, reprinted in C.N.I.L., lIe Rapport,
supra note 154, at 159-60.
162. See Dibdration No. 88-06 du 6janvier 1988, reprinted in C.N.I.L., 9e Rapport,
supra note 101, at 363.
163. See, e.g., Teleinformatics, supra note 9, at 208-17; Fishman, Introduction to Trans-
border Data Flows, 16 Stan. J. Int'l L. 1, 7, 11-12 (1980) [hereinafter Transborder Data
Flows]; Kirby Transborder Data Flows and the "Basic Rules" of Data Privacy, 16 Stan. J.
Int'l L. 27, 28 (1980); Turn, Privacy Protection and Security in Transnational Data
Processing Systems, 16 Stan. J. Int'l L. 67, 74 (1980).
164. See Hondius, Data Law in Europe, 16 Stan. J. Int'l L. 87, 102-04 (1980).
165. The French conceived of this problem, in part, through the fear that dating serv-
ices would send personal information off-shore. See Lucas, supra note 101, at 67.
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tion practice rules would be inappropriate.'6
The international instruments address the data export issue, but offer
contradictory standards. Because these instruments conflict and restrain
only some national regulation of transborder data flows, it is critical to
examine how various omnibus laws treat data exports.1 67 Although the
omnibus laws do not separately identify exports of information related to
financial services, the transborder data flow provisions apply to the infor-
mation flows associated with these services. Data flow regulation may
affect several levels of financial service activities such as intra-corporate
information processing (from corporate record keeping practices for
world-wide operations or business management of global services to the
more routine electronic mail communications across borders), inter-cor-
porate processing (such as payments), and external flows (such as the
marketing of information services).16
A. International Mechanisms
1. The Permissive OECD Guidelines
The OECD Guidelines reflect a positive view of international data
flows. The guidelines stipulate that countries should refrain from re-
stricting transborder flows of personal data unless the destination "does
not yet substantially observe these Guidelines" or fails to provide specific
protection to certain categories of sensitive information such as race, reli-
gion, or political beliefs that are subject to specific protection in the send-
ing country.169 In addition, the OECD Guidelines obligate countries to
take "all reasonable and appropriate steps to ensure that transborder
flows of personal data ... are uninterrupted"'" 0 and to avoid developing
laws or policies that create obstacles to transborder data flows. 17 1
2. The Restrictive European Convention
In contrast, the European Convention assumes that international data
flows may be a greater threat and warrant greater control. The conven-
tion permits restrictions on data flows to other signatories only if the
destination does not have "equivalent" specific legislation regulating cer-
tain categories of sensitive personal information or if data is to be "trans-
shipped" from a signatory to a non-signatory. tn The meaning of
equivalent is not defined in the European Convention, and the treaty is
166. For example, if a U.S. citizen on vacation in Paris transfers funds between U.S.
accounts using a U.S. issued credit card, there is no significant basis for France to care
about what happens to the personal information in the United States.
167. Countries that do not use the omnibus approach to fair information practice regu-
lation tend not to distinguish between domestic and international data processing.
168. See Grossman, supra note 42, at 9-12; Nugter, supra note 14, at 8-10.
169. OECD Guidelines, supra note 32, 17.
170. Id 16.
171. See i. 18.
172. European Convention, supra note 33, § 12(2).
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surprisingly silent on direct transborder data flows to non-signatory
countries. 7 3 By allowing restrictions on trans-shipment of data to non-
signatory countries, the treaty implicitly allows restrictions on all direct
transborder data flows to non-signatory countries. National laws address
this problem directly. In addition, the failure of the European Conven-
tion to define equivalent protection for sensitive data flows to signatory
countries opens the door to restrictions that may hamper credit and
health insurance services.
In the financial services context, the Council of Europe's specific gui-
dance on payment operations goes further than the European Conven-
tion and presumes that data transfers to non-signatory countries should
be prohibited. The text of the recommendation notes that "respect for
the principles contained in this recommendation.., shall be regarded by
the competent authorities in the Contracting Parties as a strong justifica-
tion for allowing personal data to be transferred." '174 Data transfers
among signatory countries are to be free of obstacles provided that
"equivalent" protection is guaranteed. 175 The notion of equivalence,
while still undefined, goes beyond the treatment of sensitive data and
applies to all payment related information.
B. National Restrictions
National Laws in Europe tend to allow or encourage the prohibition of
data exports. In France, data processing activities involving the export
of personal information must be registered with the C.N.I.L. and the
C.N.I.L. has a discretionary power to prohibit transfers abroad of per-
sonal information.1 76 Ever since the French realized that dating service
records might be sent overseas, the French have been particularly ob-
sessed with fears that personal information would be exported from
France to "data havens" for processing. 77
Among the Europeans, France appears the least hesitant to restrict
international data flows. The first published case involved the centraliza-
tion of personnel records for a multinational company. The C.N.I.L.
prohibited the transfer of data from the French subsidiary to the Italian
parent company because Italy did not have an omnibus data protection
law.178 For the same reason, the C.N.I.L. is also reported to have re-
stricted the transfer of health information from France to Belgium 179 and
173. See id. § 12.
174. Recommendation R(90)19, supra note 56, app. § 10.2.
175. Id app. § 10.1.
176. Article 19 of the French Law requires specific mention in the registration applica-
tion: "if the data processing is designed to export personal information between French
territories and foreign locations." French Law, supra note 14, § 19. Article 24 provides
that the C.N.I.L. "can prohibit" transborder data flows. Id. § 24.
177. See Lucas, supra note 102, at 67.
178. See Ddlibiration No. 89-78 du 11juillet 1989 reprinted in C.N.I.L., 10e Rapport
32-34 (1989).
179. See Delibdration No. 89-98 du 26 sept. 1989, reprinted in C.N.I.L., l0e Rapport
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other personal information from France to Switzerland and France to
the United States."1 0
Similarly, the U.K. Data Protection Registrar has begun to prohibit
international data flows. Under the British law, personal information
can only be transferred abroad when the transfer is designated on the
registration filed with the Data Protection Registrar.' 8 ' The Data Pro-
tection Registrar may issue a transfer prohibition notice interdicting the
transmission of personal information abroad when the transmission may
lead to the contradiction of the statutory principles. 8 2 The first prohibi-
tion was issued in 1990 against the transfer of a mailing list from the
United Kingdom to the United States.' 3 This first case involved an
American direct mail organization that allegedly sought to defraud Brit-
ish consumers. The precedent is noteworthy and further cases are
expected.
In the Isle of Man, a jurisdiction with a sizeable presence of multina-
tional insurance companies, the data protection statute also permits the
local authority, the Data Protection Registrar, to restrict the export of
personal information."' The Data Protection Registrar has even noted
the impropriety of prohibiting data flows to some countries while ignor-
ing problems with privacy protection in the United States.'8"
Other European laws contain similar affirmative restrictions on trans-
border data flows. Danish law prohibits the collection of sensitive data
for storage outside of Denmark including information on health, skin
color, political beliefs, philosophical or religious opinions, and union af-
filiations.'8 6 The collection of other data for use outside of Denmark
d'activitE 35-37 (1990) (health data could only be transferred in anonymous form under
agreement providing for French protections in Belgium); see also Delibdration No. 85-07
du l7fdv. 1985, reprinted in C.N.I.L., Informatique et Libertds No. 1473, 281-83 (1990)
(patient records for medical research may only be transferred aborad in anonymous
form). Where omnibus laws exist, the C.N.I.L. permits the transfer of health data. See
Delibdration No. 90-114 du 6 nov. 1990, reprinted in C.N.I.L., I le Rapport d'activit6 234-
35.
180. Interview with Ariane Mole, Attach~e Relations internationales, Direction
juridique de la Commission nationale de l'informatique et des liberts, in Paris, France
(June 6, 1991).
181. See British Law, supra note 14, § 4(3)(e).
182. Section 12(2) allows the Data Protection Registrar to prohibit data exports if the
transfer is likely to contravene or lead to the contravention of the British data protection
principles, provided that the destination is not bound by the European Convention. Sec-
tion 12(3) allows for restrictions to destinations bound by the European Convention if
certain conditions are met. See British Law, supra note 14, § 12.
183. See Office of the Data Protection Registrar, Seventh Annual Report 33-34 (1990);
First UK Ban on Data Exports is to Named Companies in the USA, Privacy L. & Bus.,
Winter, 1990/91, at 5.
184. Act to regulate the use of automatically processed information relating to individ-
uals and the provision of services in respect of such information § 12 (July 16, 1986).
185. See Office of the Isle of Man Data Protection Registrar, First Annual Report I 1
(Oct. 1989).
186. See Danish Law, supra note 14, § 21(1); Briat, Personal Data and the Free Flow of
Information in Freedom of Data Flows and EEC Law 50 (1987).
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must be licensed if a license would be required to process the information
in Denmark.' 87 The new Dutch law allows the national authority, the
Registration Chamber, to prohibit data exports for processing in destina-
tions where the protections of the Dutch law are not applicable.188 The
Dutch law, however, has a broad extra-territorial sweep. Databases con-
taining personal information relating to Dutch residents, even though lo-
cated outside of the Netherlands, will be subject to the protections of the
Dutch law if the database is under the control of a Dutch resident. 189
The Registration Chamber may exempt such foreign databases if the lo-
cal law provides "equivalent protection for the privacy of the data sub-
jects."' 19 0 In contrast, foreign data subjects may benefit from data
protection in jurisdictions where personal information is used. 19' Lux-
embourg, for example, applies the protections of its law to foreign
databases if they are electronically accessible in Luxembourg. 192
A draft proposal for a European directive on data protection contains
a strikingly restrictive transborder data flow provision. Although the
specific terms of the proposal have been rather controversial, there is lit-
tle disagreement over the need to address transborder data flow issues. 93
The first version of the proposal prohibits data flows to non-EC countries
that do not provide a guarantee of "adequate" data protection. 94 Ob-
servers believe that the final text will adopt a higher "equivalent" stan-
dard of comparison for non-EC countries. 95 In any event, the original
proposal would establish a consultative committee to draw up a list of
countries with unsatisfactory protection. 196 Transfers to these countries
would only be permitted after a case-by-case review that allows members
to object. 197
Elsewhere narrow rules may apply to financial services activities. In
Canada, for example, the Banking Act prohibits Canadian banks from
187. See Danish Law, supra note 14, § 21(1).
188. Article 49(2) of the Dutch Law provides: "data shall not be supplied from the
Netherlands to, or obtained in the Netherlands from, any data file in another country to
which this Act does not apply where it has been declared by General Administrative
Order that such a transfer of data would have a serious adverse effect on the privacy of
the persons concerned." Dutch Law, supra note 14, § 49(2).
189. See id. § 47(1).
190. Id. § 47(2).
191. See Nugter, supra note 14, at 216-24.
192. See Briat, supra note 186, at 51.
193. See Commission on Legal Affairs & Citizen's Rights, Draft Report, Eur. Parl.
Doc. (COM(90)314 final-SYN 287, 288), Explanatory Statement 1 1, 8 (1991).
194. See Draft EC Directive, supra note 14, § 24.
195. Remarks by Malcolm Norris, Data Protection Registrar, Office of the Isle of Man
Data Protection Registrar, to Electronic Democracy Conference, Washington, D.C.,
Sept. 5, 1991; Remarks by Ulla Ihnen, Directorate Gen. for Internal Market and Indus.
Aff., Comm'n of the Eur. Communities, to 4th Annual Privacy Laws & Business Confer-
ence, Cambridge University, July 3, 1991. In March, 1992, however, the European Par-
liament voted on proposed revisions and did not modify the "adequacy" standard. The
Commission may, nevertheless, incorporate the change in the next draft.
196. See Draft EC Directive, supra note 14, §§ 24(2), 27, 28(1)b.
197. See Draft EC Directive, supra note 14, § 25.
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processing client information abroad.19
III. THE FIRST LAP: A REGULATORY CHALLENGE
The international and national sanctions for data flow controls pose a
significant regulatory challenge. Conflict over international data flows
may arise at both the process and privacy substance levels; different ap-
proaches to regulation may cause friction and varying substantive rights
may also cause tension. The continued existence of varying approaches
to fair information practices' 99 and the failure to achieve harmonized
substantive rules suggest that international efforts to achieve a broad con-
sensus on privacy or data protection policy will not resolve transborder
data flow conflicts.
A. The Intra-European Challenge"m
Within the European Community, important problems arise due to the
data export prohibitions contained in national laws. A significant
number of the members of the European Community have not ratified
the European Convention.2°" Consequently, the stipulation that signato-
ries refrain from restricting data exports to other signatories does not
apply to all intra-European data flows. As a result, differences among
national laws can result in the exercise of export control mechanisms
among members of the European Community.202
Because the omnibus approach to fair information practice standards
is common in Europe, a comparison of European data protection laws
generally reveals a consistent lack of symmetry on the substantive rights,
rather than on the procedural approach." 3 The scope of the laws varies
significantly on the definition of personal information-specifically on
whether legal persons are included with individuals. These scope differ-
ences are compounded by asymmetry in the national laws on the applica-
bility to manual records as well as to computer files. The definition of
sensitive data varies. These differences may be particularly troublesome
for insurance services. Generally speaking, the interpretation of national
198. Bank Act, R.S.C., ch. B-I, § 157 (1985) (Can.).
199. The voluntary OECD approach contrasts with the Council of Europe treaty ap-
proach and the omnibus technique opposes the ad hoc technique for national rules.
200. See generally Nugter, supra note 14; The TEDIS-EDI Legal Workshop, Eur.
Comm. Doc. AT/dd(89)1814 (1989) [hereinafter The TEDIS-EDI Legal Workshop].
201. The twelve member states of the European Economic Community have each
signed the European Convention, but only Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxem-
bourg, and the United Kingdom have ratified with the enactment of conforming laws.
Portugal and the Netherlands have each enacted legislation, but have not yet ratified the
European Convention. Spain has ratified the convention, but never enacted data protec-
tion legislation. Belgium, Greece, and Italy have not succeeded in adopting legislation.
See Data Protection Roundup, supra note 14, at 2-7.
202. See supra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
203. See Nugter, supra note 14; Hondius, supra note 164; The TEDIS-EDI Legal
Workshop, supra note 200, at 12-34.
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laws may not result in the same guidance for the collection and use of
personal information by financial institutions.
The obligations on users of personal information may also vary consid-
erably. In particular, the extent to which a financial institution must
notify and obtain consent from an individual for the processing of per-
sonal information is not uniform. The French law, for instance, requires
that an individual be informed of the data collection, informed of the
consequences if information is not provided, and informed of the third
parties to whom the information may be communicated. 2" Other stat-
utes may only require that an individual be properly informed of the
purposes of data collections. Financial institutions may be exonerated
from specific obligations. The British law contains an exception to sub-
ject access for the prevention of financial services fraud.20 5 In contrast,
the French law does not contain such a distinction.2 °6 Similarly, some
laws may require notification and consent even if personal information is
not obtained directly from the concerned individual, while other laws
may not.20
7
Beyond the scope and nature of the data protection rights, the supervi-
sory rules are not uniform. Some of the laws require government ap-
proval or registration prior to the commencement of data processing
activities.208 Others may only require a declaration. °
While scholars have also argued that the Treaty of Rome might limit
restrictions on intra-European data flows,210 the Commission of the Eu-
ropean Community has recognized the lack of uniform fair information
practice standards as a major obstacle to the development of a single
European market.211 The Commission has proposed a directive that
seeks to elaborate minimum standards of data protection and to prohibit
limitations on intra-European transfers of information. These standards
combine a number of features from many of the existing national laws
and do not follow any single existing law. If approved, the directive will
require member states to enact conforming national laws. Even though
member states may continue to develop separate interpretations and
more stringent standards of fair information practice, the directive would
effectively define "equivalence" for purposes of intra-European data ex-
ports; the mandate on unrestrained information flows within Europe re-
204. See French Law, supra note 14, § 27.
205. See British Law, supra note 14, § 29.
206. But see French Law, supra note 14, § 30 (exemption for insurance providers from
certain processing limitations).
207. See, eg., Danish Law, supra note 14, § 10(1) (credit reporting agency must notify
individuals within four weeks of data collection from sources other than certain public
records); Dutch Law, supra note 14, § 5(1) (data must only be obtained legitimately).
208. See, eg., French Law, supra note 14, § 16.
209. See, e.g., German Law, supra note 14, § 32(1).
210. See, e.g., Briat, supra note 186, at 48 (discussion of Treaty of Rome and informa-
tion flows); Cole, supra note 35, 928-41 (same).
211. See Draft EC Directive, supra note 14, Preamble; The TEDIS-EDI Legal Work-
shop, supra note 200.
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quires that differences in national standards be ignored-the directive
will, in effect, set forth a "minimum equivalent level of protection."
B. The United States Challenge
Between the European countries with data export rules and the United
States, conflicts have been predicted for over a decade. 2 Recent experi-
ence suggests that the predictions of transfer obstacles are becoming a
reality for international data flows.213 The proposed European directive
on data processing puts the comparison issue clearly on the international
agenda for financial services.
In comparing United States privacy protection to European rules of
fair information practice, the obvious starting point is the process: the
United States lacks an omnibus law. In the financial services field, how-
ever, some of the sectoral laws do cover many of the substantive aspects
embodied in the European laws.2" 4 Nevertheless, in contrast to the thor-
oughness of omnibus legislation, the ad hoc techniques used in the
United States leave significant gaps in comparable coverage for fair infor-
mation practice standards.21 5
Some of the basic omnibus protection principles for data collection
correspond to existing United States rights. Obtaining data fairly and
lawfully corresponds to the state privacy right against intrusion upon se-
clusion.2" 6 However, the seclusion right only protects against shocking
data collections,2" 7 unlike the lower standard inherent in European no-
tions of "fairness".21 ' A few of the financial services laws have similar
rights.219 Significantly, the federal credit reporting law does not address
issues of notice and consent.' 2 Even with some guidance for fair and
legitimate data collection practices in the financial services field, limita-
tions on the collection of sensitive data are rare under United States law
in contrast to the European regulation."'
212. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 35, at 918-26; Teleinformatis, supra note 163, at 214-
15; Transborder Data Flows, supra note 163, at 8-11.
213. See supra notes 178-80, 183, 185; see also Draft EC Directive, supra note 14, § 24
(proposing a mechanism to blacklist countries with unsatisfactory privacy protection for
international data flows).
214. See Reidenberg, supra note 23, at 219-20.
215. See id. at 219-20, 234-36.
216. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
217. The right protects against improper conduct in the acquisition of personal infor-
mation and will not apply to voluntarily disclosed information. See Reidenberg, supra
note 23, at 222-23.
218. See, e.g., Fifth Report, supra note 112, at 102-03 (setting forth the Data Protec-
tion Principles and their interpretation).
219. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681q (1988) (prohibits ob-
taining credit reports under false pretenses).
220. See Reidenberg, supra note 23, at 211. An exception exists for investigative re-
ports of information collected personally from third parties. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681(d)(a)(1) (1988).
221. Some state regulations restrict the storage of sensitive data for credit reporting
activities. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1321 (West 1980 & Supp. 1990) prohib-
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The limitations on purpose found in omnibus legislation are occasion-
ally seen in United States law. Electronic fund transfer statutes at the
state level sometimes restrict the use of collected data222 and the federal
Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits the use of certain types of data
for discriminatory purposes in the granting of credit.223 The permissible
purposes for which credit reference data may be used can differ.224 Like
the United Kingdom, the use of third-party information for credit deci-
sions would be prohibited in the United States.225 Unlike France, United
States law prohibits the use of data relating to age, sex, nationality and
marital status for the purposes of determining credit.226 In contrast to
European laws, United States law allows private sector credit reporting
agencies to store and use information about criminal convictions.227 Per-
sonal information gathered by a credit reporting agency in the United
States is only supposed to be disclosed for a statutorily enumerated pur-
pose.2 28 However, the statute allows disclosures for "any legitimate busi-
ness need" and does not restrict the secondary use that a legitimate
recipient may make of disseminated information. In limited circum-
stances, the state right against misappropriation of an individual's name
may also provide protection. 229 Generally, however, there is no analo-
gous right for the opt-out view of payment-related information.230
Few rights exist in the United States that are comparable to the Euro-
pean ban on the collection and storage of unnecessary personal informa-
iting the preparation of a report containing sensitive information such as race, religion,
sexual preference, political affiliation or belief); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 380j (McKinney
1984 & Supp. 1991) (setting forth information prohibited in consumer reports including
data or race, religion, ancestry, or ethnic origin).
222. See Reidenberg, supra note 23, at 230. Cf Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1692 (1988) (limits use of information regarding debtor's financial situation).
223. See 15 U.S.C. 1691(a)(1) (1988).
224. Compare infra note 228 and accompanying text (U.S. law allows secondary uses
provided that a statutorily authorized purpose has been satisfied) with supra note 119 and
accompanying text (French and British law restrict narrowly the purposes for which such
data may be used.)
225. Compare Miller v. American Express Co., 688 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1982) (credit
decisions based on third-party characteristics are banned in the United States) with Data
Tribunal Cases, supra note 149.
226. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1988) (limitation on the use of personal infor-
mation for discrimination in the extension of credit) with NS 13, supra note 152 (permis-
sion to use age, sex, marital status and nationality for credit decisions provided that no
decisions are automatic on the basis of credit scoring).
227. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1988) (allows storage of criminal records) with
French Law, supra note 14, § 30 (limits data processing of criminal records to govern-
ment authorities or quasi-public enterprises and insurance companies) and Dutch Law,
supra note 14, § 7(1) (allows special limits to be set for the use of criminal records).
228. Those purposes essentially are establishing the individual's eligibility for: (1)
credit; (2) employment; (3) insurance; (4) professional licensure; and (5) any other legiti-
mate business need. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 1681b (1988).
229. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. This right may protect an individ-
ual against the commercial use of one's name without consent if the use "appropriates"
characteristics of the individual's personality. See Reidenberg, supra note 23, at 225-27.
230. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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tion. Some American states ban the collection of extraneous information
for purchases made by credit card or check.23 1 However, the federal leg-
islation for credit reporting actually sanctions the collection of over-
broad, unnecessary information. 232
Accuracy concerns are seen in United States financial services laws.
The Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Fair Credit Billing Act each obli-
gate reporting parties to grant rights of access and objection to consum-
ers.233 The Electronic Fund Transfer Act provides similar access rights
to transaction records.' The personal data withheld in a recent British
case-ATM transaction records 2"-would be subject to automatic dis-
closure under United States law. 6 In these situations, the United States
result may provide stronger access protections than seen in some Euro-
pean countries. State insurance statutes are also concerned with accu-
racy.2 37 Additionally, at the state level, the right against false light
publicity may provide some protection."B This right will only protect
against disclosures to a broad segment of the public that portray the indi-
vidual in a false light or misleading way such as the broad dissemination
of inaccurate personal information. Sufficiently broad publication of per-
sonal information, however, would be rare for the financial services
sector.
Unlike the European counterparts, the duration of storage is generally
ignored by United States law. Although the credit reporting legislation
purports to limit the dissemination of certain types of potentially sensi-
tive obsolete personal information, such as paid tax liens, arrest and con-
viction records, suits and judgment history, the law allows disclosures
beyond the statutory period of seven years (and consequently storage be-
yond seven years) if requested in connection with specified transac-
tions. 39 These transactions will cover a substantial number of cases. In
231. See, eg., Cal. Civ. Code § 1747.8 (West Supp. 1992); Del. Code Ann. tit. 11,§§ 914, 915 (Supp. 1991); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 832.075 (West Supp. 1992); Md. Com. Law II
Ann. Code § 13-318 (Supp. 1991); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 520-a (McKinney Supp. 1991);
Va. Code Ann. § 11-33.1 (Michie Supp. 1991); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 62A.3-512
(West Supp. 1992).
232. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (1988); Reidenberg, supra note 23, at 211.
233. See 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1988); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(g), 1681i (1988).
234. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693d (1988).
235. See Halifax Building Society Acquitted in 1st UK Data Protection Crown Court
Case, Privacy L. & Bus., Winter 1990/91, at 16-19 (case focused on whether Halifax held
the data in conformity to registered purposes and did not challenge the denial of card-
holder access). A subsequent Data Protection Tribunal case did address access and only
required disclosure to the individual if the person concerned stated good reasons for de-
siring access. See Halifax Building Society v. The Data Protection Registrar, U.K. Data
Protection Tribunal Appeal Decision, Jan. 25, 1992.
236. See 15 U.S.C. § 1693d (1988).
237. See Reidenberg, supra note 23, at 233-34.
238. See Reidenberg, supra note 23, at 224-25; supra notes 79-80 and accompanying
text.
239. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1988).
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any event, the European laws may prohibit the storage and disclosure
beyond shorter periods of time.
Another critical difference between the United States and omnibus ap-
proaches is the supervision mechanism. Existing fair information prac-
tice rights in the United States emphasize private litigation as the
mechanism for enforcement, rather than administrative action. Consis-
tent with this policy, the United States has no filing or licensing require-
ment for data processing activities.
Even in financial services contexts that are covered by both the ad hoc
United States rights and the European data protection statutes, the inter-
pretation of substantive rights can still be problematic. For example, in
France, reporting on individual credit repayment histories is made to the
Banque de France. The Banque de France may not maintain adverse
information longer than three years. 4' In the United States, such
records are maintained by private credit reporting agencies and restric-
tions may also apply to data storage, but none are as short as three
years. 24
1
C. The Asian Challenge
In a situation similar to the United States, the Asian reliance on ad hoc
techniques for the regulation of fair information practice invites tension
with the European laws over both procedural and substantive issues.242
While the European regulators have curiously avoided significant discus-
sion of Asian standards of fair information practice, several Asian juris-
dictions have focused on the comparisons. In Japan, international
pressures stimulated work on the financial services code of practice.243
In Hong Kong, the international perspective has been an important fac-
tor in the Law Reform Commission's work to shift from the ad hoc tech-
nique to a broader legislative approach. 2"
As for the substantive standards, the voluntary guidelines in Hong
Kong and the FISC guidelines in Japan each follow the more permissive
OECD approach. The FISC policy, for example, does not draw narrow
limitations on data collection and permissible uses like the European
laws. If a financial institution is authorized to engage in business activ-
ity, then any personal information may be collected to further that activ-
240. See Ddlibdration No. 90-72 du 29 mai 1990, reprinted in C.N.I.L., lie Rapport,
supra note 154, at 150-53.
241. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c (1988).
242. See, eg., M. Horibe, Privacy in Japan: The Development of Policy on Personal
Data Protection, 78 Japan Computer Q. 3 (1989) (tracing the development of local and
national regulations leading to the present state of Japan's personal data protection);
Yamashita, supra note 87 (discussing Japan's attempt to formulate guidelines for protect-
ing personal data in the private sector); Mortimer, supra note 95 (recommendations of the
Privacy Subcommittee of the Hong Kong Law Reform Commission); Berthold, supra
note 95, at 13-21 (same).
243. See FISC, supra note 87, at 1.
244. See Mortimer, supra note 95; Berthold, supra note 95, at 13-21.
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ity24 s and the use for any data processing purposes in firtherance of
authorized activities is permitted.2' Disclosure of personal information
to third parties is expressly permitted, even without the knowledge or
consent of the data subject, if such disclosures further authorized busi-
ness activities of a financial institution and the data subject has no "justi-
fiable" interest worthy of protection.247 The limitation for justifiable
interests seems rather meek. Similar to the European laws, the FISC
guidelines recommend rights of access and correction248 and require limi-
tations on data storage, though, unlike the European laws, the guidelines
do allow storage beyond the time required to fulfill legitimate
purposes.249
Unlike the European laws, the Japanese and Hong Kong guidelines do
not recommend supervision or enforcement mechanisms. Additionally,
no remedies are suggested for non-compliance with these voluntary stan-
dards, though government persuasion may exist and provide some form
of sanction.25 ° As a result, the substantive rights do not appear to have
quite the same legal character as the European laws.
IV. THE FINISH LINE: CONCEPTUAL CHOICES FOR THE
REGULATORY CHALLENGE
Whether a regulatory decision to restrict data exports will be based on
"equivalency" or "adequacy" of data protection in the destination coun-
try, the underlying policy concern for the exporting country is the suffi-
ciency of foreign fair information practice standards. In the realm of
transnational financial services, the search for suffciency will necessarily
be complex. Personal information may transit a multitude of countries
and be processed in several jurisdictions. As a result, a series of data
export rules may apply and a series of complicated comparisons of fair
information practice laws may be involved.25'
The international failures to achieve convergence on the approach and
content of fair information practice standards suggests an important con-
ceptual choice for transborder data flows. Whether European regulators
take a rigid, superficial view of different sets of regulation or whether
they use a more subtle, nuanced assessment will be a critical issue. Rigid
245. See FISC, supra note 87, § I.1(1) & cmt. B.
246. Id § II.2.(1) & cmt. B.
247. Id. § 11.2(2) & cmt. C.
248. Id § H.4
249. Id. § II.3(1) & cmt. C.
250. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
251. The discussion in this Article assumes that the exporting country has a legitimate
interest in regulating fair information practices. Choice of law issues for the applicable
national law might otherwise be raised. For example, if a transaction in the United States
between U.S. citizens is processed abroad, conflict of law analysis may dictate that U.S.
fair information practice regulation should apply exclusively. Similarly, a conflict of law
analysis may be able to narrow the comparisons. However, such analyses are beyond the
scope of this Article.
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comparisons of foreign standards for fair information practice are likely
to encourage needless controversy for transnational financial services.
The alternative is for government regulators to accept a degree of flexibil-
ity and tailor regulatory applications to particular information transfer
contexts. A shared vision of flexibility and regulatory customization
broadens the possibilities for data exports and allows new legal and ex-
tra-legal policy instruments to satisfy fair information practice standards.
A. Standards of Comparison
Although various standards of comparison are defined in the interna-
tional instruments and in national laws to determine the permissibility of
data exports, significant ambiguity remains. The OECD Guidelines
frame the issue in terms of substantial compliance with the data protec-
tion principles;2 2 the European Convention gives no guidance for non-
signatories and uses an "equivalency" standard for restrictions among
signatories; 253 national laws may set no particular standard or may re-
quire "equivalency" of protection;254 and, the proposed harmonization
rule for the European Community is likely to adopt an "equivalency"
standard.2 5 The conventional wisdom suggests that "equivalence" may
impose a higher standard for the sufficiency of foreign laws. However,
under any of these standards, several interpretations are possible: the
satisfactory nature of foreign standards may depend on the similarity of
approach to fair information practices, the comparability of substantive
rights, or some combination of each.
If the data protection authority of an exporting country chooses to
examine only the process side of foreign fair information practices, the
foreign regulatory approach then becomes the only relevant criteria.
France seems to favor this line of inquiry.25 6 Paradoxically, in cases
where omnibus legislation exists in the foreign destination, the failure of
existing omnibus laws to converge on identical standards suggests that
the process inquiry has limited utility. Actual comparability will still
depend on the substantive rights under any given omnibus law.
For financial services, a superficial comparison of regulatory schemes
would be devastating. Neither the United States nor Asian countries
would be able to satisfy such a threshold and information flows would be
seriously encumbered for global services. Nevertheless, when the foreign
destination does not have omnibus legislation, a comparison of fair infor-
mation approaches does not presumptively require data flow restrictions.
National regulatory schemes that follow the ad hoc method may for a
252. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 176-98 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 193-197 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text. The C.N.I.L. decisions were
based on the lack of a foreign omnibus law. The reports do not indicate that any inquiry
into foreign substantive rights took place.
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particular sector have an equivalent "sectoral/omnibus" law. In these
cases, a process inquiry must choose between broad and narrow compari-
sons. A broad comparison favors data flow restrictions, while the narrow
view satisfies concerns over foreign fair information practice standards
without burdening transnational flows of information. The proposed Eu-
ropean directive seems to favor the narrow view; although the basic rule
on transborder data flows looks generally at the destination country's fair
information practice standards, the derogation procedure contemplates a
narrower analysis of data transfers. In the case of the United States, even
a narrow view of sectoral comparisons may not sufficiently help financial
257services.
The process inquiry also leads to a comparison of enforcement and
supervision mechanisms. Different approaches to fair information prac-
tice regulation tend toward divergent enforcement and supervision mech-
anisms." 8 Any comparison of these differences is likely to favor data
flow restrictions where the European country has a powerful data protec-
tion authority and the foreign destination does not. Ironically, the wis-
dom of encouraging the creation of government supervisory agencies
with broad search and seizure powers can be questionable in some socie-
ties, such as those with totalitarian histories or unstable governments.
Attempts to define broad standards for comparison are incongruous
with the complex character of the information marketplace. In particu-
lar, the financial services sector represents global networks with many
players. The flow of personal information over financial networks in-
cludes data needed for infrastructure purposes as well as data inherent in
financial service products. Because the comparison of approaches sug-
gests the desirability of a sectoral interpretation, the context of particular
information transmissions is important.
An alternative to the process comparison is a search for parallel sub-
stantive standards. This choice of a comparison standard for data export
regulation emphasizes a context-based evaluation.25 9 Any comparative
analysis of substantive rights would necessarily focus on the type of data
transfer and the available sectoral rights in the destination. The choice of
this comparison raises administrative costs. Case-by-case analysis would
be required for foreign data transfers.2" However, generic solutions
257. See supra text accompanying notes 212-41.
258. See supra notes 92-93, 99-102 and accompanying text.
259. See Reidenberg, A Commentary on Data Protection, Privacy and Regulatory Con-
flicts between the European Community and the United States, Access Reports, May
1991, at 8-9.
260. See U.K. Data Protection Registrar, Home Office Consultation CEC COM 314
final-SYN 287, 288, 4.2.9 (Dec. 3, 1990) (criticizing both the complete black-listing of
countries and the alternative case-by-case vetting procedure in the Draft EC Directive,
particularly with respect to financial services and travel). But see Remarks by Malcolm
Norris, Data Protection Registrar, Office of the Isle of Man Data Protection Registrar, to
the Electronic Democracy Conference, Washington, D.C., Sept. 5, 1991 (indicating that
under a future EC data protection directive, case-by-case decisions will likely be needed
as the short-term route for EC-USA data flows); Remarks by Ulla Ihnen, Directorate
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would not work well with the complex information processing arrange-
ments that are common in the financial services sector. Furthermore, as
computer technology itself develops, the difficulties of case-by-case analy-
sis can be reduced with techniques such as computerized decision sup-
port systems.26'
Each of these regulatory choices points toward a need for flexibility in
dealing with fair information practices. Both the process and substantive
choices for comparisons of fair information standards suggests a focus on
narrow contexts.
B. Reconciling Diversity2 62
Flexibility suggests that a variety of techniques, in addition to the legal
comparisons, will be necessary for fair information practice rules to keep
pace with a rapidly changing technological and business environment.
As financial services networks evolve, the nature of the information flows
will change and the national treatment of fair information practices will
evolve. If history is a guide, the evolution of national fair information
practice regulation is not likely to result in uniform, international stan-
dards. Instead, international convergence on a set of techniques to man-
age persistent differences can provide a means for reconciling the
diversity of fair information practice standards around the world; con-
vergence on the tools to manage national differences offers a bridge
across divergent national standards.
This view of a shared international regulatory analysis attempts to cre-
ate a customized set of fair information practice standards for fair infor-
mation flows. The tailored "customized regulation" may include
combinations of the functional legal comparisons, contractual devices,
technological solutions, information network configurations, and societal
Gen. for Internal Market & Indus. Aft., Comm'n of the Eur. Communities, to the 4th
Annual Privacy Laws & Business Data Protection Conference, Cambridge University,
July 3, 1991, at 12 (commenting that category reviews will be likely under any final EC
data protection directive).
Various procedural issues are also directly related to the choice of an appropriate stan-
dard of comparison. Transborder data flow restrictions necessitate that regulatory au-
thorities make judgments about foreign law. The procedures and sources of information
for agency findings have significant consequence. If, for example, the foreign jurisdiction
has no corresponding government authority, as is presently the case with the United
States, a decision based on arguments by interested private parties may not reflect accu-
rately on nuances and varying interpretations of the state of the law in the foreign juris-
diction. Problems will clearly arise for countries where the law on fair information
practices is evolving and no single, definitive interpretation exists.
261. See G. Greenleaf & A. Mowbray, The Privacy Workstation (Paper presented at
4th Annual Privacy Laws & Business Data Protection Conference, Cambridge Univer-
sity, July 4, 1991).
262. This theory of managing regulatory differences derives from a presentation made
by the author to a meeting on "Networld Order Scenarios" in Paris, June 7, 1991. See
Reidenberg, Personal Information and Global Interconnection: The Challenge of
Regulatory Convergence, Project Promethee Perspectives, Dec. 1991, at 27-36.
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constraints. 263
The starting point for a shared vision of diversity management is the
comparison of substantive rights on a functional basis. If similar stan-
dards exist for the particular information being transferred in the context
of specific uses, then there is no need for any bridge. The treatment of
transaction data, for example, from credit card purchases may be pro-
tected similarly in different jurisdictions through various combinations of
legal rights. However, the differences among national laws suggest that
no true uniformity of fair information standards will exist even for these
narrow sectoral uses of information. As a result, gaps will need to be
covered.
The contractual solution is one method to resolve conflicting levels of
privacy protection.2" Data transfers may be permitted if contract rights
are granted to supplement the existing fair information practice laws of
the destination.265 The contractual approach, however, assumes that
data transfers are rather discrete transactions between two entities. Fi-
nancial services organizations tend not to follow this model.266 Financial
services networks are often comprised of numerous parties sharing and
creating information in symbiotic ways. As a result, a simple contract
between the exporter and recipient of personal information may not be
appropriate for the circumstances.26 The success of contractual devices
also depends on the legal enforceability of these private contracts. In
some jurisdictions, this may be troublesome because individuals are usu-
ally third-party beneficiaries to a transborder data flow contract between
the data exporter and recipient. Some countries do not allow the en-
forcement of third party beneficiary rights.268 Consequently, additional
techniques need to be available for increased flexibility.
Beyond the functional legal protections and contractual rights, the
technology itself may be used to satisfy fair information practice stan-
dards. In some cases, the choice of technology can be used to minimize
conflicts. For example, the increasing use of smart cards in the financial
263. Id at 34-35.
264. See Note, Contracts for Transnational Information Services" Securing Equivalency
of Data Protection, 22 Harv. Int'l LJ. 157, 171-75 (1981); Brian Napier, Contractual
Solutions to the Problem of Equivalent Data Protection in Transborder Data Flows (pa-
per presented at conference on "Legal Challenges and Opportunities Created by the Pro-
lific Growth of Electronic Information Services," organized jointly by the Council of
Europe and the Commission of the European Communities, Luxembourg, March 27-28,
1990) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Model Contract Designed to Ensure
Equivalent Data Protection for TBDF, Privacy L. & Bus., Oct. 1991, at 6-7.
265. This solution was used by the C.N.I.L. in the Fiat decision. See supra note 178.
Austria has taken the same approach. See Compte rendu, supra note 16, at 308.
266. See Brandon & Halvey, The Outsourcing Decision.: Avoiding Pitfalls, Am. Banker,
Jan. 15, 1992, at 4-5 (describing outsourcing practices).
267. See Reidenberg, An American Solution to TBDF Contractual Problems, Privacy L
& Bus., Dec. 1991, at 12-14.
268. See Napier, supra note 264.
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services community offers the means to erase data and thus minimize the
significance of any discrepancies in laws on the duration of data storage.
In a similar way, the configuration of financial services networks can
be useful to accommodate asymmetrical national standards of fair infor-
mation practices. If the network configuration limits the duration of
storage of personal information through data purging, then differences in
national standards for data storage become irrelevant. Similarly, if the
network prevents secondary uses of personal information such as market-
ing activities through blocking, then differences in national standards are
unimportant. In many instances, financial services use personal informa-
tion on a global basis in innocuous ways for administrative purposes.269
For these cases, the network may also be structured so that information
is coded and barriers to access and use are established in order to pre-
clude practices that might be inconsistent with fair information stan-
dards. By preventing certain information collections or uses without
legal intervention, actual conflicts over fair information regulation be-
come irrelevant.
These legal and technical solutions may also be supplemented by socie-
tal pressures. In seeking to retain a positive public image, companies
have an incentive to adopt a certain degree of fair information practice
standards.2 70 Similarly, in some countries, such as Japan, the govern-
ment involvement in private sector codes may provide sufficient quasi-
legal pressure for companies to comply with fair information practice.27'
Although social pressure cannot be asserted as a panacea, it may be help-
ful and powerful in conjunction with the other tools. In many instances,
though, fair information practices may be challenged by "transparent"
companies, or those buried deep in the infrastructure of data processing.
But, for these hidden companies, there is only a small public image issue
and the social pressure would be weak.
CONCLUSION
National and international regulation of fair information practices di-
rectly affect the provision of transnational financial services. Standards
of fairness for data processing are evolving both at the national and inter-
national levels. Different approaches to regulation and varying substan-
tive rights exist at both levels.
Although some efforts have been made by the OECD and the Council
of Europe, the harmonization of national information processing laws
has not been successful. The approach and substantive rights continue to
differ in countries around the world. The recent proposals from the Eu-
269. See Berkvens, supra note 6 (administrative acts in connection with payment oper-
ations defy relevancy of general data protection principles.)
270. See, eg., Am. Express, supra note 85 (describing the company's policy not to
disclose any customer information without prior consent from the customer).
271. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
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ropean Commission are similarly not likely to result in identical stan-
dards across Europe.
As part of the regulation of fair information practices, the interna-
tional instruments and national laws establish mechanisms to prohibit
data exports to countries without satisfactory standards of fair informa-
tion practice. The mechanisms rely on comparisons of national laws. In
light of the global community's failure to achieve convergence on stan-
dards of fair information practice, these comparisons are likely to en-
courage export prohibitions. For financial services, such restrictions
would be crippling.
The standards for comparing national fair information practice regula-
tion suggests a number of choices. These choices favor examinations
based on the particular context for information flows. The comparisons
also suggest that regulatory flexibility is desirable to bridge inconsequen-
tial national differences.
Regulatory flexibility can be enhanced by the use of legal, technologi-
cal, and societal techniques. A shared vision of the appropriate tech-
niques can be quite useful to reconcile otherwise conflicting regulatory
schemes. This notion of convergence establishes a mechanism to custom-
ize fair information practice standards for specific contexts. As a result,
the irreconcilable differences between the debates in the national and in-
ternational contexts can be avoided.
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